Equal Sentences for Unequal Participation: Should the Eighth Amendment Allow All Juvenile Murder Accomplices to Receive Life Without Parole? by Gallini, Brian R.
GALLINI.FMT 12/8/2008 11:01:36 AM 
 
[29] 
Articles 
BRIAN R. GALLINI∗ 
Equal Sentences for Unequal 
Participation: Should the Eighth 
Amendment Allow All Juvenile 
Murder Accomplices to Receive 
Life Without Parole? 
 
he bare fact that a sentence is within the maximum which 
the legislature has prescribed does not prevent it from 
violating the constitutional provision forbidding the imposition 
of cruel and unusual punishments.”1 
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides 
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”2  
Although initially construed narrowly to prohibit only barbarous 
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1 Barber v. Gladden, 309 P.2d 192, 196 (Or. 1957), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948 
(1959). 
2 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.  Initially, the Eighth Amendment did not apply to 
the states.  Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) 
(plurality).  In Robinson v. California, however, the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  370 U.S. 
660, 667 (1962). 
“T 
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forms of punishment such as torture,3 the Eighth Amendment 
now prohibits sentences that are either contrary to the evolving 
standards of decency in our maturing society,4 or 
disproportionate to the commission of a defendant’s underlying 
offense.5  Although, at first blush, the Amendment’s 
development suggests that it serves to limit a state’s power to 
punish, a cursory review of pertinent Supreme Court decisions 
reveals that the Eighth Amendment poses a low constitutional 
hurdle.6 
Thus, the task of determining what comprises cruel and 
unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment 
remains formidable.7  The Supreme Court’s vacillation on key 
punishment issues, like the constitutionality of imposing the 
 
3 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1879). 
4 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
5 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003). 
6 See, e.g., id. at 30–31 (upholding a twenty-five-year-to-life sentence imposed 
pursuant to a California recidivist statute for felony grand theft (i.e., stealing three 
golf clubs worth approximately $1200)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) 
(upholding two consecutive twenty-five-year-to-life sentences under a California 
recidivist statute for two counts of petty theft); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
995–96 (1991) (holding that a sentence of life without parole for possession of 672 
grams of cocaine did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464 
(holding that it was not “cruel and unusual” to force petitioner to undergo 
execution of second death warrant after administration of first failed as a result of a 
mechanical accident); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912) (affirming 
life sentence for a horse thief pursuant to a West Virginia recidivist statute and 
noting that petitioner could not “maintain[] that cruel and unusual punishment has 
been inflicted”). 
7 See infra note 100; see also, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) 
(holding that cuffing an inmate to a hitching post for longer than necessary to 
restore order violates the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
320–21 (2002) (holding that it is “cruel and unusual” to execute the mentally 
retarded); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986) (finding it 
unconstitutional to execute an insane defendant); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
592 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is disproportional to the crime of rape); 
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (holding that a ninety-day sentence was excessive for 
narcotics addiction); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (holding that denationalization as a 
punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 
U.S. 349, 381–82 (1910) (holding that punishment of fifteen years jailed in irons at 
hard and painful labor for the crime of falsifying records was excessive); In re 
Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890) (“[T]he solitary confinement to which the prisoner 
was subjected . . . was an additional punishment of the most important and painful 
character, and is, therefore forbidden by . . . the Constitution of the United 
States.”); see also Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 822 (Alaska 1968) (reversing 
thirty-six-year sentence imposed upon defendant convicted of passing checks with 
insufficient funds). 
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death penalty on both mentally retarded and juvenile offenders, 
has further confused the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s 
already imprecise language.8  No critique of the Eighth 
Amendment’s application to juveniles would be complete 
without recognizing that states are perhaps equally to blame for 
the confusion.  It took nearly three decades for a majority of 
states to determine the permissibility of sentencing a juvenile 
killer to prison for life without parole.9 
The constitutional boundaries of juvenile life sentences 
nevertheless remain unclear.  Despite litigants’ logical 
expectations that courts would assign a lesser sentence to 
nonkilling juveniles, courts still impose identical sentences on 
juvenile offenders who had drastically different roles in the 
crimes for which they were convicted.  Consider the juvenile 
defendant who aided and abetted in killing his father’s shop 
employee by (1) helping the shooter enter the shop under false 
pretenses, (2) robbing the shop after the shooter killed the 
victim, and (3) manipulating the crime scene to make it appear 
that someone had forcibly entered the shop.10  In contrast, 
consider the fourteen-year-old defendant who had a history of 
sexual and physical abuse and was forced by her boyfriend to 
lure a man into their house to rob him.11  After doing so, she left 
 
8 Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“A majority of States 
have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, 
and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
321 (“[T]he Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to 
take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405)), 
with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“We discern neither a 
historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital 
punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.”); Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (“[W]e cannot conclude today that the Eighth 
Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of 
[petitioner’s] ability convicted of a capital offense simply by virtue of his or her 
mental retardation alone.”). 
9 See infra Part II.C and accompanying discussion. 
10 Dang v. State, 154 S.W.3d 616, 617–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (subsequent 
history omitted). 
11 ACLU OF MICH., SECOND CHANCES: JUVENILES SERVING LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS 13 (2004), http://www.aclumich.org/pubs/ 
juvenilelifers.pdf [hereinafter SECOND CHANCES].  The defendant, Barbara 
Hernandez, and her abusive boyfriend, the principal, received the same life without 
parole sentence.  Id.; cf. Toomey v. Clark, 876 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(pregnant sixteen-year-old received life in prison for helping her boyfriend lure a 
robbery victim, who the boyfriend unexpectedly shot).  According to Hernandez’s 
sister, the boyfriend “locked [Hernandez] up in a bedroom with no clothes, he 
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the room and her boyfriend stabbed the man to death.12 
Notwithstanding their varying participation in the victim’s death, 
both juveniles received sentences of life without parole. 
No court has addressed the federal constitutional significance, 
if any, of sentencing juvenile murder accomplices who play a 
minimal role in a murder to life in prison without parole.  No 
precedent clarifies whether it is cruel and unusual to impose life 
in prison on juvenile offenders after a first-degree murder 
conviction imposed pursuant to either the felony-murder 
doctrine or accomplice/coconspirator theories of liability, despite 
their minimal involvement in the victim’s death.  To investigate 
these unanswered questions, Part I of this Article explores the 
imposition of life without parole sentences on juvenile nonkillers 
convicted of murder via either the felony-murder doctrine or 
accomplice liability.13  Part I illustrates the problematic nature of 
imposing these sentences on less-culpable juvenile nonkillers 
convicted of first-degree murder by offering examples of 
defendants who received identical sentences yet played different 
roles in the victims’ deaths.  Part II outlines the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
“cruel and unusual” clause before examining the Court’s 
application of the clause to juveniles.  Part II concludes by 
evaluating the application of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence to juvenile punishment in the lower 
courts. 
Finally, Part III asserts that automatically sentencing juvenile 
nonkillers to life in prison without parole precludes lower courts 
from exercising judicial discretion in order to individualize 
juveniles’ sentences.  Part III then argues that the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence provides no remedy 
because it is ill-equipped to handle a juvenile nonkiller’s Eighth 
 
threw an ashtray at her, [and] he burned her with cigarettes.”  Karen Bouffard, 
Group Aims to Set Abuse Victims Free; Clemency Petitions Ready for Inmates Who 
Murdered, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005, at 1B. 
12 Id.; see Karen Bouffard & Jennifer Brooks, Engler Won’t Free 13 Battered 
Women; Abuse Wasn’t Allowed as Defense at Their Trials, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 18, 
2002, at 1A (“Hernandez left home to escape an abusive mother and stepfather.  
Her father was in prison for rape.  Her stepfather routinely molested her.”). 
13 At least two commentators more broadly examined whether the felony-murder 
rule should apply to juveniles at all.  Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGowen Keegan, 
Abolishing the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule When the Defendant Is a Teenager, 28 
NOVA L. REV. 507 (2004). 
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Amendment challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole following a murder conviction given pursuant to 
felony murder or accomplice liability.  Taken together, Part III 
contends, these deficiencies allow for further erosion of the 
ideals underlying juvenile punishment. 
I 
THE PROBLEM OF IMPOSING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
SENTENCES ON JUVENILE NONKILLERS 
As determinate sentencing systems grow, so do examples of 
sentences imposed without individualized consideration of the 
circumstances surrounding a defendant’s participation in the 
crime.  Murder prosecutions of juvenile nonkillers via 
accomplice liability or the felony-murder doctrine illustrate two 
examples of the sometimes inequitable results produced by 
harsh determinate sentences.  Accordingly, Section A examines 
the unique problem of the felony-murder doctrine’s application 
both to juvenile principals and accomplices.  To help focus the 
issue outside the context of felony murder, Section B thereafter 
offers case studies at opposite ends of the participation 
spectrum.14 
 
14 For an interesting compilation and discussion of juveniles serving life without 
parole sentences in the state of Michigan, see SECOND CHANCES, supra note 11. 
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A.  The Unique Problem of Felony Murder 
1.  Juvenile Principals Convicted of Felony Murder15 
The typical formulation of the felony-murder rule imposes 
first-degree murder liability upon a defendant who causes a 
death during the commission or attempted perpetration of an 
enumerated felony.16  As a general rule, the Eighth Amendment 
permits sentencing of juvenile principals convicted of felony 
 
15 The first, and perhaps most obvious, question is how juveniles end up in adult 
court.  Various methods exist for transferring a juvenile into adult criminal court, 
including: (1) waiver; (2) direct file/statutory exclusion; and (3) once-an-adult-
always-an-adult statutes.  Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children as Adults: The Transfer 
of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 175, 181 (2007); Scott C. Zarzycki, Note, A Current Look at Ohio’s 
Juvenile Justice System on the 100th Anniversary of the Juvenile Court, 47 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 627, 646 (1999).  Regardless of the method for transferring a juvenile into 
adult criminal court, a juvenile’s commission of felony murder has historically–and 
not surprisingly–always formed the basis for prosecution in adult court.  E.g., WIS. 
STAT. § 938.18(1)(a) (2007) (stating that a petition for waiver may be filed if the 
juvenile committed, inter alia, felony murder on or after the juvenile’s fourteenth 
birthday); see also In re Michael B., 650 A.2d 1251, 1256–59 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) 
(affirming juvenile court’s decision to transfer respondent to adult court following 
the juvenile court’s finding of probable cause that respondent committed felony 
murder by shooting to death a mother, her son, and their family dog during a 
burglary at their home); State v. Gribble, 655 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) 
(“[A] juvenile is triable as an adult for the offense of ‘murder’ when the offense is 
‘felony-murder’ regardless of whether he is triable as an adult for the underlying 
felony.”); Snodgrass v. State, 406 N.E.2d 641, 642 (Ind. 1980) (noting that felony 
murder is an offense that, when committed by a child, would serve to characterize 
the child as an adult).  But cf. People v. Smith, 547 N.Y.S.2d 150, 153 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1989) (holding that juvenile defendant may be convicted of felony murder only 
if the underlying felony constituted a felony for which the juvenile could have been 
held criminally responsible as an adult). 
16 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06, 556–71 (4th 
ed. 2006).  The origins of the felony-murder rule are both “questionable,” People v. 
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980), and “obscure,” Rudolph J. Gerber, The 
Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763, 764 
(1999).  The early felony-murder rule arose from scholarly writing, rather than the 
common law, and was rarely applied to cases.  See Guyora Binder, The Origins of 
the American Felony-Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 64 (2004) (observing that 
the first true felony-murder rule did not appear until the nineteenth century in 
America).  In fact, in early England, almost all felonies potentially were punishable 
by death.  Id.  Thus, it made little difference to a felony murderer whether he was 
executed for murder or the underlying felony.  Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 310–11.  
Contra Leonard Birdsong, Felony Murder: A Historical Perspective by Which to 
Understand Today’s Modern Felony Murder Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 1, 13 (2006) (asserting that execution rates in England varied greatly and 
likely were not as widespread as commonly believed). 
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murder to life in prison without parole.17  For example, one court 
imposed a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
sixteen-year-old defendant who was convicted of first-degree 
felony murder after he shot an expectant mother following a car 
jacking;18 another court imposed a sentence of life without 
parole plus sixty-two years on juvenile defendant who, at age 
sixteen, committed kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated 
sexual battery, and felony murder.19 
An instructive exception to this rule is People v. Dillon.20  The 
defendant in Dillon, a seventeen-year-old high school student, 
was convicted following a jury trial of first-degree felony murder 
after he and several others attempted to steal marijuana from a 
marijuana farm, during which defendant panicked and fatally 
shot a man who was guarding the farm.21 
Defendant appealed, contending, inter alia, that his sentence 
of life imprisonment violated the “cruel or unusual 
punishment[]” clause of the California Constitution.22  At the 
outset of its analysis, the California Supreme Court observed 
that the felony-murder rule “condemns alike consequences that 
are highly probable, conceivably possible, or wholly 
unforeseeable,” and, correspondingly, “the Legislature has 
provided only one punishment scheme for all homicides 
occurring during the commission of or attempt to commit an 
 
17 E.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 855 A.2d 885, 892 (Pa. 2004) (upholding 
juvenile’s life sentence for felony murder); Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing and remanding on other grounds but “reject[ing] the 
argument that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual 
punishment on a twelve-year-old child and that it violates [a]rticle I, [s]ection 17 of 
the Florida Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution”). 
18 People v. Launsburry, 551 N.W.2d 460, 463–64 (Mich. App. 1996). 
19 State v. Taylor, No. 02C01-9501-CR-00029, 1996 WL 580997, at *24 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Oct. 10, 1996). 
20 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983). 
21 Specifically, defendant and seven other boys entered the victim’s farm with the 
intent to steal his marijuana.  Id. at 701.  After climbing the hill toward the victim’s 
farm, they split into pairs and spread out around a field.  Id.  Upon seeing one of the 
victim’s brothers tending to the plants, the boys elected to wait, prompting at least 
two to give up altogether.  Id.  As one of the boys attempted to return to the farm, 
he accidentally twice discharged his weapon.  Id.  Amidst the chaos, the victim had 
circled behind defendant and was approaching him with a shotgun.  Id.  As the 
victim drew near, defendant discharged his weapon, hitting the victim nine times; 
the victim died from his wounds several days later.  Id. 
22 Id. at 700. 
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offense listed [by statute] regardless of the defendant’s 
individual culpability with respect to that homicide.”23  The court 
continued, “in some first degree felony-murder cases this 
Procrustean penalty may violate the prohibition of the California 
Constitution against cruel or unusual punishments.”24 
With its disdain for the felony-murder rule as background, the 
court proceeded to evaluate defendant’s challenge by using a 
proportionality analysis.25  In doing so, it emphasized the 
importance of considering the nature of the offense (i.e., by 
evaluating “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offense”) and the nature of the offender (i.e., 
by assessing defendant’s “age, prior criminality, personal 
characteristics, and state of mind”).26  With those factors in 
mind, the court observed, “a punishment which is not 
disproportionate in the abstract is nevertheless constitutionally 
impermissible if it is disproportionate to the defendant’s 
individual culpability.”27 
Turning to the facts of the case, the Dillon court gave 
credence to defendant’s trial testimony, which presented a 
“plausible picture . . . of the evolution of defendant’s state of 
mind during these events–from youthful bravado, to 
uneasiness, to fear for his life, to panic.”28  Additionally, in 
evaluating defendant’s specific circumstances, the court 
highlighted trial testimony from a clinical psychologist who 
stated that defendant was both intellectually and emotionally 
immature.29  This, alongside the jury’s apparent reluctance to 
 
23 Id. at 719. 
24 Id. 
25 To evaluate a proportionality challenge in California, a court considers the 
following “techniques” outlined in In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972): (1) the 
nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of 
danger both present to society, noting in the presence of aggravating circumstances 
or whether the offense was nonviolent, id. at 931; (2) a comparison of “the 
challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for 
different offenses which, by the same test, must be deemed more serious,” id.; and 
(3) “a comparison of the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for 
the same offense in other jurisdictions having an identical or similar constitutional 
provision,” id. at 932. 
26 Dillon, 668 P.2d at 720–21. 
27 Id. at 721. 
28 Id. at 722–23. 
29 Id. at 723. 
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convict defendant30 and the limited punishment given to 
defendant’s cohorts,31 led the court to conclude that “the 
punishment of this defendant by a sentence of life imprisonment 
as a first degree murderer violates article I, section 17, of the 
[California] Constitution.”32  Although based on a state 
constitution, the Dillon decision suggests that the felony-murder 
doctrine may provide a basis for juveniles convicted of felony 
murder to argue for lesser sentences.33 
2.  Punishing Juvenile Nonkillers Convicted of Felony Murder 
No opinion provides explicit guidance on whether the Eighth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution permits sentencing a 
juvenile nonkiller convicted of felony murder to life in prison 
without parole.  Several juvenile felony-murder cases illustrate 
the problem of imposing that sentence on juvenile nonkillers, 
regardless of their actual role in the victim’s death.  For example, 
compare the facts in the following two cases: In People v. Petty,34 
the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed a life without parole 
sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old Gregory Petty, who 
encouraged his twelve-year-old companion to commit armed 
robbery.35  During the course of the robbery, the twelve-year-old 
shot and killed the victim because the defendant threatened to 
kill him if he did not shoot the victim.36 
In contrast, the defendant in Kaiser v. Hannigan37 was merely 
present at the time of the victim’s death.  Specifically, seventeen-
 
30 During its deliberations, the jury specifically asked if it could bring in a verdict 
of second-degree murder or manslaughter even if it found that defendant’s killing 
occurred during an attempted robbery.  Id. at 724. 
31 Id. at 727. 
32 Id.; cf. State v. Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401, 409 (Idaho 1991) (“As we read the 
lead opinion and those of the concurring justices, the result was dictated more by 
the California court’s consideration of the felony murder rule than it was by the 
defendant’s age.”), overruled on other grounds, State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482 (Idaho 
1992). 
33 See Drizin & Keegan, supra note 13, at 531 (arguing, at a minimum, that the 
felony-murder rule was never intended to punish children under the age of fourteen 
because children that age are incapable of forming a criminal intent). 
34 665 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 2003). 
35 Id. at 445. 
36 Id.  Defendant’s twelve-year-old companion pled guilty to second-degree 
murder and received a “delayed sentence.”  Id. at 445 n.1. 
37 No. CIV.97-3239-DES, 1999 WL 1289470 (D. Kan. Dec. 16, 1999), aff’d, Kaiser 
v. Nelson, 229 F.3d 1163, 2000 WL 1125608 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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year-old defendant Joshua Kaiser and triggerman Jason 
Schaeffer absconded from a juvenile drug-treatment facility and 
conspired to steal a car.38  Armed with an unloaded sawed-off 
shotgun, Shaeffer, along with defendant, spotted the victim 
starting his car.39  Although defendant suggested they simply 
steal the car, Schaeffer insisted on kidnapping the victim by 
forcing him into the trunk.40  The trio subsequently drove out to 
the country, where Schaeffer stopped the car, made the victim 
stand facing away from him, and then shot him in the back of the 
head.41  Notwithstanding his comparatively lesser role in the 
victim’s death, Kaiser–like Petty–received a life sentence.42  
Again, however, neither of these representative opinions 
provide any Eighth Amendment analysis and therefore serve 
only to provide illustrative examples of juveniles who receive 
identical sentences notwithstanding their disparate roles in the 
victim’s death. 
Even the few opinions that provide some remote guidance on 
the level of participation necessary to sustain a juvenile 
nonkiller’s felony-murder conviction and life without parole 
sentence make apparent the need for clearer constitutional 
boundaries.  In People v. Cavitt,43 seventeen-year-old James 
Freddie Cavitt and two other juveniles, seventeen-year-old 
Mianta McKnight and sixteen-year-old Robert Williams, 
planned to burglarize McKnight’s house where she lived with 
her stepmother.44  To commence the robbery, McKnight let 
Cavitt and Williams into the house where the boys threw a sheet 
over McKnight’s stepmother, and secured her with rope, duct 
tape, and plastic cuffs.45  While Cavitt and Williams secured the 
stepmother, they repeatedly punched her in the back to quiet 
 
38 Id. at *1. 
39 Id.  Although the shotgun was not loaded, Schaeffer had shells in his pocket.  
Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Kaiser, 2000 WL 1125608 (noting that Kaiser received life for aggravated 
kidnapping, life for felony murder, fifteen years to life for aggravated robbery, and 
one to five years for unlawful use of a weapon); State v. Kaiser, 918 P.2d 629, 632 
(Kan. 1996) (same).  Nothing in any of the Kaiser opinions suggests that Kaiser will 
ever be eligible for parole. 
43 91 P.3d 222 (Cal. 2004). 
44 Id. at 226. 
45 Id. 
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her.46  The pair then ransacked the house, tied up McKnight next 
to her stepmother, and left under the impression that the 
stepmother was still breathing.47  McKnight’s stepmother 
subsequently died from asphyxiation.48 
Cavitt and Williams were convicted following a jury trial of 
felony murder notwithstanding their contention that McKnight 
killed her stepmother out of hatred after the pair left the house.49  
In affirming defendants’ convictions, the California Supreme 
Court held that “the felony-murder rule does not apply to 
nonkillers where the act resulting in death is completely 
unrelated to the underlying felony other than occurring at the 
same time and place.”50  Thus, “there must be a logical nexus–
i.e., more than mere coincidence of time and place–between the 
felony and the act resulting in death before the felony-murder 
rule may be applied to a nonkiller.”51  The court clarified that 
regardless of whether the nonkiller was present at the time of 
the victim’s death, a temporal relationship between the 
underlying felony and the homicide exists so long as the felony 
and the killing are part of one continuous transaction.52 
Turning to the facts of the case, the court held that a logical 
nexus existed between the burglary and the murder.53  Without 
considering Cavitt’s age, the court reasoned that “the crimes 
involved the same victim, occurred at the same time and place, 
 
46 Id. (noting that McKnight’s stepmother “sustained extensive bruising to her 
face, shoulders, arms, legs, ankles and wrists, consistent with blunt force trauma”). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 225.  McKnight claimed that her stepmother was not breathing and that 
she then called her father who called the police.  Id. at 226.  Although medics were 
able to get a heartbeat, McKnight’s stepmother suffered brain damage and later 
died from asphyxiation caused in part by her injuries.  Id. 
49 Id. at 227.  Cavitt was also convicted of personally inflicting great bodily injury 
during the commission of a murder.  Id.  Although he received a twenty-five-year-
to-life sentence–as opposed to life without parole–the analysis underlying the 
court’s decision further focuses the inquiry on how much a juvenile nonkiller must 
participate in the underlying felony preceding the killing in order to sustain a 
conviction for felony murder.  See id. (noting Cavitt’s sentence); see also Julie N. 
Lynem, Man Convicted of Murder in ’95 Brisbane Slaying, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 
1999, at A16 (reporting that the sentencing court spared Cavitt from a sentence of 
life in prison without parole because of Cavitt’s age at the time of the killing and his 
expression of remorse). 
50 People v. Cavitt, 91 P.3d 222, 227 (Cal. 2004). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 227, 234. 
53 Id. at 231. 
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and were each facilitated by binding and gagging [the 
stepmother].”54 
At first blush, the California Supreme Court’s pronouncement 
that “a nonkiller cannot be liable under the felony-murder rule 
where the killing has no relation to the felony other than mere 
coincidence of time and place”55 seems to address the need for 
each co-felon to participate in some meaningful way in the 
killing in order to sustain a conviction and corresponding life 
without parole sentence.  Yet, the amorphous “coincidence of 
time and place” language associated with this “logical nexus” 
test provides more questions than answers.  Although 
subsequent opinions suggest that the participation threshold is 
low,56 litigants and commentators are nonetheless left to wonder 
what specific role, if any, a juvenile’s age serves in the analysis. 
B.  Juvenile Murder Accomplices 
The imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile 
nonkiller convicted of murder as an accomplice or coconspirator 
raises similar constitutional problems to those presented by 
juvenile felony-murder cases.57  For example, the defendants in 
Swinford v. State and People v. Miller were merely present when 
the victims were killed, whereas the defendants in Salinas v. State 
and People v. Jensen contributed extensively to the victims’ 
deaths.  Yet, notwithstanding their varying levels of 
participation, the applicable law mandated that all defendants 
receive a life without parole sentence. 
1.  Minimal Participation: Darla Jo Swinford 
“On December 28, 1990, twenty-two days after her fourteenth 
birthday, Darla Jo Swinford was present when her eighteen        
[-]year-old boyfriend shot and killed a young man whom Darla 
 
54 Id. at 236. 
55 Id. at 231. 
56 See, e.g., People v. Dominguez, 140 P.3d 866, 878 (Cal. 2006) (“Liability for 
felony-murder . . . extends to those who knowingly and purposefully participate in 
the underlying felony even if they take no part in the actual killing.”). 
57 See infra note 296 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion in a 1996 decision that the evolving standards of decency did not 
preclude a life without parole sentence imposed upon a fifteen-year-old murder 
accomplice). 
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had dated.”58  Swinford began dating the triggerman, George 
Johnson, Jr., at the age of twelve.59  After Johnson returned from 
a trip to Florida with a friend and soon-to-be accomplice, he 
learned that Swinford–now fourteen–had initiated a 
relationship with the victim, Jamie Medlin, a Horn Lake, 
Mississippi, teenager.60 
Out of jealousy, Johnson sought to take action against 
Medlin.61  To do so, Johnson “told Swinford that he wanted to 
meet and talk with Jamie Medlin.  Swinford informed Jamie 
Medlin of Johnson’s wishes and then arranged for them to meet 
behind a Malone & Hyde factory in DeSoto County.”62  During 
the meeting, Swinford “suspected trouble” when she saw the gun 
but, rather than seeking help, she remained in Medlin’s car while 
“Johnson blew Jamie Medlin’s face away with a close-range blast 
from [a] borrowed shotgun.”63  Two days after Swinford fled 
with Johnson and his accomplice, the trio was arrested in 
Florida.64  Following a jury trial, Swinford was convicted of 
aiding and abetting Johnson in the commission of Medlin’s 
murder, for which she received a life sentence.65 
Although appellate counsel for Swinford failed to challenge 
the duration of her sentence,66 counsel did contend that the trial 
court should have announced its reasons on the record for 
declining to impose an alternative criminal sanction on Swinford 
 
58 Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 912, 918 (Miss. 1995) (Banks, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  In response to the dissent’s characterization of 
Swinford’s involvement, the majority, in holding that sufficient evidence existed to 
support a guilty verdict, notes: (1) that “Swinford testified that she suspected 
trouble when she saw Johnson arrive with a gun”; (2) “[s]he neither tried to stop the 
discussion or leave for help”; and (3) “she subsequently traveled with Johnson and 
Branum to Florida with packed bags.”  Id. at 915 (majority opinion). 
59 Id. at 913. 
60 Id. at 913–14. 
61 Id. at 914. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 914–15.  Johnson and his accomplice, without Swinford’s help, dragged 
the body into the nearby woods.  Id. at 914. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  There is no indication in the Swinford opinion that defendant will have the 
opportunity to seek parole. 
66 Counsel for Swinford is an eminent domain attorney.  See Attorneys–Smith, 
Phillips, Mitchell, Scott & Nowak, http://www.smithphillips.com/attorneys.php 
?attorney=5 (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
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as a youth offender.67  Despite the clear absence of on-the-
record reasons from the trial court, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court merely “admonish[ed]” the trial court for its failure and 
noted that this case did not present the type of special 
circumstances necessary to invoke the requested alternative 
sentence.68  Instead, the court observed without further analysis 
that Swinford “was a typical Horn Lake teenager” who did not 
merit an alternative sentence.69 
2.  Minimal Participation: Leon Miller 
On November 19, 1997, two victims were shot and killed 
outside a Chicago apartment complex.70  Four people were 
charged for their involvement in the crime, including fifteen-
year-old Leon Miller who served as a “lookout.”71  For his role 
in the victims’ deaths, a jury convicted Miller of murder.72  Yet, 
 
67 Swinford, 653 So. 2d at 917.  The Mississippi Youth Court Act enabled the trial 
judge to “‘in his discretion, commit such child to the county jail for any term not in 
excess of one (1) year’,” suspend sentence, commit the child to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections, or impose a fine as though the child were an adult.  Id. 
at 917 (quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-159(3) (Supp. 1990)). 
68 Id. at 918. 
69 Id. (citing White v. State, 374 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1979)).  Other than the 
outcome of the White decision, no aspect of that opinion supports the Swinford 
court’s transparent reasoning.  See infra note 253 and accompanying text (noting 
that the single paragraph of constitutional analysis in the White opinion is 
“unaccompanied by legal citation or consideration of defendant’s age”). 
 Moreover, this comment as the basis for a court’s reasoning is particularly 
egregious given that the court declines to elaborate on who is, in fact, a “typical” 
Horn Lake teenager.  As of the 2000 census, the 7.2-square-mile city of Horn Lake 
housed a population of 14,099 residents, less than ten percent of whom earned a 
bachelor’s degree, CityData.com, http://www.city-data.com/city/Horn-Lake-
Mississippi.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2008), as compared to the Mississippi average 
of more than eighteen percent and the nationwide average of roughly twenty-seven 
percent, U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov (follow “Data Sets” 
hyperlink; then follow “Ranking Tables” hyperlink under “2005 American 
Community Survey; then follow “R1402 Percent of People Who Have Completed a 
Bachelor’s Degree” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).  These facts by 
themselves suggest that there is nothing “typical” about growing up as a Horn Lake 
teenager.  More importantly, even a half-hearted effort to individualize Swinford’s 
sentence demands a more detailed inquiry into, at a minimum, the role of her age, 
her background, and psychological condition.  In this case, however, the trial court 
sentenced Swinford without even the benefit of a presentence report.  Swinford, 653 
So. 2d at 918 (Banks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
70 People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ill. 2002). 
71 Id. at 302–03. 
72 Id. at 303. 
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rather than imposing the statutorily required life sentence on 
Miller, the trial court sentenced him to serve fifty years and held 
that the Illinois “multiple-murder” statute violated both the 
Illinois and federal constitutions.73 
Following the State’s appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court 
affirmed and, in doing so, engaged in a proportionality analysis 
to determine whether “the punishment for the offense is cruel, 
degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to 
shock the moral sense of the community.”74  In concluding “that 
the penalty mandated by the multiple-murder sentencing statute 
as applied to this defendant is particularly harsh and 
unconstitutionally disproportionate,” the court reasoned that: 
(1) the “multiple-murder” statute prevents a sentencing court 
from considering the offender’s age or participation level in the 
crime, (2) the automatic transfer statute required the sentencing 
court to treat Miller as an adult, and (3) the accountability 
statute equated Miller with the actual shooter.75  According to 
the court, “[w]hen these three statutes converge, a court never 
considers the actual facts of the crime, including the defendant’s 
age at the time of the crime or his or her individual level of 
culpability.”76 
3.  Substantial Participation: Erik Brendan Jensen 
Nathan Ybanez met Erik Brendan Jensen when a mutual 
friend, Brett Baker, introduced them at a pizzeria in Highlands 
Ranch, Colorado.77  Unbeknownst to Jensen when he and Baker 
 
73 Id. at 303–04.  When sentencing Miller, the trial court observed, “I have a 15-
year-old child who was passively acting as a look-out for other people, never picked 
up a gun, never had much more than–perhaps less than a minute–to contemplate 
what this entire incident is about, and he is in the same situation as a serial killer for 
sentencing purposes.”  Id. at 303. 
74 Id. at 307. 
75 Id. at 308.  Notably, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
holding on the basis of the state constitution.  Id. at 309–10. 
76 Id. at 308.  In passing, the court also highlighted the distinction between adult 
and juvenile offenders, noting in particular that, “as a society we have recognized 
that young defendants have greater rehabilitative potential.”  Id. at 309.  Yet, the 
court simultaneously cautioned that “[i]t is certainly possible to contemplate a 
situation where a juvenile offender actively participated in the planning of a crime 
resulting in the death of two or more individuals, such that a sentence of natural life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is appropriate.”  Id. 
77 Both Erik Jensen and Nathan Ybanez were profiled as part of PBS Frontline’s 
recent special entitled “When Kids Get Life.” Frontline: When Kids Get Life (PBS 
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invited Ybanez to join their rock band, Ybanez was enduring 
significant problems at home, including both physical and sexual 
abuse.78  Those problems culminated on June 5, 1998,79 when 
Ybanez’s mother told him she was sending him to a Christian 
military school.80 
That evening, then-seventeen-year-old Jensen, high on 
marijuana, drove then-sixteen-year-old Ybanez to his apartment, 
where Ybanez went inside and told Jensen to check on him if did 
not return in twenty minutes.81  Approximately thirty minutes 
later, Jensen went up to the apartment, where Ybanez’s mother 
let him in.82  As Jensen entered the apartment, however, Ybanez 
hit his mother in the head with fireplace tongs.83  Jensen 
admitted at trial that he provided Ybanez with plastic wrap to 
suffocate Ybanez’s mother and that he “dropped” the fireplace 
tongs on her.84  More pointedly, according to trial testimony 
from Baker, Jensen “told him that he had hit the victim three 
times in the head with the tongs, and that the last time, the tool 
 
television broadcast May 8, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/whenkidsgetlife [hereinafter Frontline, Ybanez & Jensen].  The totality of 
the program’s transcript, along with interviews, original video, and analysis remains 
available on the PBS Web site.  Id.  Given that the opinion issued by the Colorado 
Court of Appeals provides limited background facts (it declines even to note that 
Jensen was a juvenile at the time of the crime), this Article makes periodic 
reference to the PBS interviews to provide a more complete factual context. 
78 Frontline, Ybanez & Jensen, supra note 77.  The signs of Ybanez’s troubled 
home life prompted Jensen’s and Baker’s parents to intervene by contacting a social 
worker, yet no social worker was ever assigned to investigate.  Id. 
79 The PBS Web site erroneously lists 1996 as the year of the crime, but a review 
of pertinent news articles clarifies that the crime took place on this date in 1998.  
E.g., Jason Blevins, Teen Blames Fear for Role in Slaying of Friend’s Mom, 
DENVER POST, Aug. 6, 1999, at B2 (noting date of crime was June 5, 1998); Jason 
Blevins, Trial Under Way for Teen in Slaying of Friend’s Mom, DENVER POST, Aug. 
5, 1999, at B2 (same). 
80 Frontline, Ybanez & Jensen, supra note 77.  Baker later testified at trial that 
Ybanez had previously told him he was going to kill his mother that night because 
she had threatened to send him to school and that Jensen was “scared shitless.”  
People v. Jensen, 55 P.3d 135, 138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
81 Jensen, 55 P.3d at 137; Jason Blevins, Teen Killer Gets Life Term: Jensen 
Helped Slay Pal’s Mom, DENVER POST, Aug. 12, 1999, at B2 (noting Jensen was 
seventeen at the time of the killing); Jason Blevins, Teen Blames Fear for Role in 
Slaying of Friend’s Mom, DENVER POST, Aug. 6, 1999, at B2 (noting Ybanez was 
sixteen at the time of the crime). 
82 Jensen, 55 P.3d at 137. 
83 Id. at 137–38. 
84 Id. at 138. 
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‘got stuck in her head; and when he pulled it out, that’s how the 
blood got on the ceiling.’”85  Ybanez completed the killing by 
using the fireplace tongs to strangle his mother.86  The pair 
subsequently called Baker, who helped them clean up the 
scene.87  A jury convicted Jensen of first-degree murder, along 
with conspiracy and accessory charges.  Jensen received a 
sentence of life in prison without parole on the murder charge 
and concurrent sentences of twenty-four years and six years on 
the conspiracy and accessory counts.88 
4.  Substantial Participation: Jorge Alfredo Salinas 
On the evening of July 28, 2001, seventeen-year-old Jorge 
Alfredo Salinas was at home smoking marijuana with his 
brother, Lorenzo, and acquaintance, Oscar Villa Sevilla, when 
Sevilla expressed his desire to steal a car.89  Salinas retrieved a 
shotgun, gave it to Sevilla, and the pair walked to a nearby 
intersection.  Sevilla entered the road and pointed the shotgun at 
Geronimo Morales, driver of the first car that stopped at the 
intersection.90  Sevilla and Salinas forced their way into the car; 
Sevilla got into the driver’s seat and pushed Geronimo to the 
 
85 Id.  This is the testimony that earned Jensen a spot under the heading 
“Substantial Participation.”  Without it, Jensen’s case could easily represent an 
example of “Minimal Participation.”  Interestingly, on that note, the prosecutor 
initially charged Jensen and Baker as accessories in the murder, but both were 
released on bail.  Frontline, Ybanez & Jensen, supra note 77.  Baker, however, 
entered into a plea bargain and agreed to testify against Jensen.  Id.  As part of that 
testimony, Baker told prosecutors that Jensen knew in advance about the murder 
and had told Baker he hit Ybanez’s mother with the tongs three times.  Id.  In 
exchange for his testimony, Baker received total immunity from the murder 
charges, a shortened preexisting sentence he was serving in a juvenile facility, and 
an agreement by prosecutors not to revoke his probation stemming from other 
charges.  Id.  At trial, Jensen denied hitting Ybanez’s mother with the fireplace 
tongs.  Jason Blevins, In Testimony, Jensen Denies Swinging Tongs at Ybanez, 
DENVER POST, Aug. 10, 1999, at B-06. 
86 Jensen, 55 P.3d at 138. 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  Jensen initially explored plea negotiations for second-degree murder, but 
they fell through in the wake of the Columbine school shootings.  Frontline, Ybanez 
& Jensen, supra note 77; Luke Turf, Headed for Trouble Erik Wanted to Help His 
Friend Get Out of the House: He Succeeded–They’re Both in Prison for Life, 
DENVER WESTWORD, July 7, 2005, available at http://www.westword.com/2005-07-
07/news/headed-for-trouble/. 
89 Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 
90 Id. at 737–38. 
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passenger seat while Salinas got into the backseat where twenty-
one-month-old Leslie Ann Morales sat in her car seat.91  Initially, 
Sevilla demanded money from Geronimo but, when Geronimo 
stated that he did not have any, Sevilla began beating him.92  
Sevilla then stopped the car, dragged Geronimo into an orchard 
and shot him, after which he stole Geronimo’s wallet, a gold 
ring, and a silver necklace.93 
Sevilla subsequently returned to the car, and the pair–along 
with the baby–returned to Salinas’s house to pick up Lorenzo.94  
Upon seeing the baby in the car, Lorenzo suggested that they 
leave her where someone would find her.  Sevilla, however, 
insisted on driving a mile and a half outside of town where he 
and Salinas took the baby out of the car, still in her car seat, and 
left her in tall grass.95  Border patrol officers later recovered her 
lifeless body on July 29, 2001.96  In the interim period, before 
their capture, the three cohorts (1) attempted to sell Geronimo’s 
car, (2) sold the shotgun, and (3) fled to Mexico where they 
abandoned Geronimo’s car after engaging in a car chase with 
Mexican authorities.97 
Following his capture on August 3, 2001, Salinas was indicted 
for, and convicted of, three counts of capital murder and was 
sentenced to death.98  In response to his appeal, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the convictions but reduced 
Salinas’s sentence to life in prison without parole because he was 
seventeen years old at the time of the crime.99 
 
91 Id. at 738. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  Authorities recovered Geronimo’s body on August 1, 2001.  Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 738. 
96 Id.  Leslie Ann died from dehydration, exposure to the elements, and 
heatstroke.  Id.  Testimony from the patrol officer reflected that the child was in an 
area where she was not likely to be found.  Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Specifically, the three-count indictment charged Salinas with capital murder in 
the course of a robbery, committing multiple murders in the same criminal 
transaction, and murder of a child under the age of six.  Id. at 741 n.3; see Jim 
Pinkerton, Teen Arrested in Killing of Man, Baby; Police Seek 2 Other Suspects, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 4, 2001, at A38 (noting date of Salinas’s capture). 
99 Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 743.  Salinas has not fared well in prison; on August 18, 
2004, he stabbed a prison guard thirteen times with a metal rod from a typewriter.  
Steve McVicker, Proposal for TVs on Death Row Tuned Out; Backers Say State Is 
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The foregoing examples illustrate the problematic nature of 
applying the extraordinarily harsh penalty of life without parole 
on juvenile nonkillers who had disparate levels of participation 
in the victim’s death.  Indeed, the lack of individualized 
consideration of each juvenile’s participation raises questions 
about how current Supreme Court Eighth Amendment 
standards would treat the sentence of life without parole.  It is to 
these questions that this Article now turns. 
II 
THE IMPACT OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ON FEDERAL AND 
STATE COURTS 
This Part of the Article broadly considers the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and then 
focuses on the Court’s historical treatment of juvenile offenders 
in the capital context.  Finally, this Part considers how lower 
courts have applied the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence to juvenile punishment. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court has never precisely defined the phrase 
“cruel and unusual.”100  The phrase does, however, hold a penal 
connotation, and its inclusion in the Constitution derives from 
the English Bill of Rights of 1688.101  Early interpretations of the 
clause dating back to 1879 understood the terms “cruel and 
 
Ignoring a Tool to Control the Condemned, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 5, 2004, at A1.  
Amazingly, the guard was not seriously injured.  Id. 
100 Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (“What constitutes 
a cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided.”); Howard v. 
Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903) (“But it is unnecessary to attempt to lay down any 
rule for determining exactly what is necessary to render a punishment cruel and 
unusual . . . .”), with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“The prohibition 
against ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ like other expansive language in the 
Constitution, must be interpreted according to its text, by considering history, 
tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the 
constitutional design.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (“The 
authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition against the 
infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but they made no attempt to define the 
contours of that category.”). 
101 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958) (noting the principle represented 
by the “cruel and unusual” phrase is traceable back to the Magna Carta); Louisiana 
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (“Prohibition against the 
wanton infliction of pain has come into our law from the Bill of Rights of 1688.”). 
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unusual” to prohibit only punishments of torture, such as “where 
the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of execution [for 
treason],” “where he was embowelled alive, beheaded, and 
quartered [for high treason],” or where a female was burned 
alive for treason.102  Accordingly, the Court rejected early 
assertions that a punishment violated the Eighth Amendment 
solely because of its excessive duration.103 
The Court’s approach expanded in 1910, when it recognized in 
Weems v. United States that “it is a precept of justice that 
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
offense.”104  With that in mind, the Court invalidated a fifteen-
 
102 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1879).  Interestingly, even these early 
interpretations recognized that “the sentence of death” does not inflict cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Id. at 137; see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) 
(observing that “the punishment of death is not cruel” because the Eighth 
Amendment “implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more 
than the mere extinguishment of life”). 
103 O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339–41 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) 
(discussing cases).  But cf. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899) 
(“But it is possible that imprisonment in the state prison for a long term of years 
might be so disproportionate to the offence as to constitute a cruel and unusual 
punishment.”).  In O’Neil, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction for “selling 
intoxicating liquor without authority” and corresponding sentence to “pay a fine of 
$6140, and the costs of prosecution, taxed at $497.96, and stand committed until the 
sentence should be complied with”; and if the “fine and costs, and costs of 
commitment, ascertained to be 76 cents, the whole aggregating $6638.72, should not 
be paid before March 20, 1883, he should be confined at hard labor, in the house of 
correction at Rutland, for the term of 19,914 days.” 144 U.S. at 330.  Although the 
Court reasoned that the case presented no federal question, id. at 335–36, the 
dissent asserted that the language of the Eighth Amendment prohibited not only 
sentences involving torture, but also “all punishments which by their excessive 
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged,” id. at 339–40 
(Field, J., dissenting). 
104 Weems, 217 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added).  As later courts would observe, 
however, “[t]he principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is 
deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.”  Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).  The concept of proportionality dates back to the 
Magna Carta which, in 1215, dedicated three chapters to emphasizing that fines as a 
punishment may not be excessive.  Id.  The principle made its way through the 
common law, beginning with the First Statute of Westminster in 1275, and 
continuing when prison sentences became common.  Id. at 285 (citation omitted).  
The English Bill of Rights reiterated the principle of proportionality and, when the 
Framers based the language of the Eighth Amendment on the English Bill of 
Rights, they too incorporated this concept.  Id. at 285–86. 
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go 
beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of 
the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide 
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year prison sentence, including hard labor, imposed upon a 
defendant who falsified a public record.105  Armed with this more 
discretionary approach to Eighth Amendment issues, the Court 
in Trop v. Dulles applied its proportionality analysis nearly a 
half-century later to strike down a statute that authorized a 
military court to revoke a soldier’s citizenship and leave him 
stateless as a penalty for wartime desertion.106  Although the 
Court recognized death, prison, and fines as examples of 
constitutionally acceptable sentences,107 a plurality of the Court 
held that denationalization “is a form of punishment more 
primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the 
political existence that was centuries in the development.”108  
The Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment’s scope “is not 
static,” and the text “must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”109 
Notwithstanding the seemingly firm ground upon which 
proportionality was initially based, a series of post-Trop 
decisions left the viability of proportionality challenges 
uncertain.110  For example, a proportionality analysis seemed 
indispensable in Coker v. Georgia where the Court held that a 
death sentence is disproportionate to the crime of raping an 
adult woman, and it therefore violates the Eighth 
Amendment.111  The Court reasoned, after taking guidance 
“from the objective evidence of the country’s present judgment 
 
at least the same protection–including the right to be free from excessive 
punishments. 
Id. at 286 (emphasis added). 
105 Weems, 217 U.S. at 357–58, 381–82. 
106 356 U.S. at 101. 
107 Id. at 100. 
108 Id. at 101. 
109 Id. at 100–01; see Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (“The [‘Cruel and Unusual’] clause 
of the Constitution in the opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore 
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public 
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” (citing Ex parte Wilson, 114 
U.S. 417, 427 (1885))). 
110 Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983) (“And our prior cases have 
recognized explicitly that prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.”), 
with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J.) (“Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no 
proportionality guarantee.”). 
111 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
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concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of an 
adult woman,”112 that only Georgia authorized such a sentence 
(two other jurisdictions provided for capital punishment when 
the victim is a child).113 
At first, the Court’s decision in Coker seemingly represented 
the only application of proportionality review to non-capital 
cases.  In Rummel v. Estelle,114 petitioner was convicted–at 
different times–of credit card fraud, forgery, and theft (each 
felonies) involving the total sum of $229.11.115  After his third 
conviction, petitioner was sentenced to life in prison (with the 
possibility of parole) pursuant to a Texas recidivist statute; in 
response, petitioner asserted that his punishment was 
disproportionate to his crimes and therefore constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment.116  The lower courts denied petitioner’s 
writ of habeas corpus, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding 
that petitioner’s life sentence did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.117  The Court reasoned that “[o]utside the context 
of capital punishment, successful challenges to the 
proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly 
rare,”118 and that for crimes “punishable by significant terms of 
 
112 Id. at 593.  Notably, the petitioner in Coker had previously raped and stabbed 
a young woman to death on December 5, 1971.  Id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
Roughly eight months later, petitioner kidnapped a second young woman, whom he 
raped twice, stripped, beat, and left in a wooded area.  Id.  For these crimes, he was 
sentenced to three life terms, two twenty-year terms, and one eight-year term of 
imprisonment.  Id.  While serving those sentences, petitioner escaped in September 
1974, after which he immediately raped another woman, abducted her, and 
threatened to kill her.  Id.  It was this crime for which the Georgia court sentenced 
petitioner to death.  Id.  As the dissent noted, the plurality’s holding “prevents the 
State [of Georgia] from imposing any effective punishment upon Coker for his 
latest rape.”  Id. 
113 Id. at 595–96 (plurality opinion). 
114 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
115 Id. at 264–66. 
116 Id. at 267. 
117 Id. at 285. 
118 Id. at 272.  The Court emphasized the limited utility of challenges to the 
proportionality of noncapital sentences.  See id. (“Because a sentence of death 
differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long, our 
decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases 
are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment meted 
out to [petitioner].”).  But see, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) 
(“Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to 
scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 
667 (1977) (noting that the Eighth Amendment broadly “proscribes punishment 
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imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence 
actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.”119 
Yet, in Solem v. Helm,120 the Court reaffirmed the utility of 
the proportionality analysis in noncapital cases.121  In Solem, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a life without parole 
sentence imposed on petitioner after his seventh nonviolent 
felony (uttering a “no account” check for $100).122  In affirming 
the Eighth Circuit’s holding that petitioner’s sentence violated 
 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime” (citing Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910))); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The 
principle of disproportionality has been acknowledged to apply to both capital and 
noncapital sentences.”).  At least one subsequent decision reinforced that the Court 
would no longer entertain proportionality challenges to noncapital sentences.  See 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam) (refusing a proportionality 
review of a forty-year prison sentence and $20,000 fine imposed on a defendant 
convicted of possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana). 
119 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274.  Such a statement suggests that, at least for a time, 
states could punish any offense with any noncapital sentence without being 
constrained by the Eighth Amendment. 
120 463 U.S. 277, 277–78 (1983). 
121 Although not a focal point of the case, perhaps the Court’s opinion in Rhodes 
v. Chapman suggested the forthcoming resurgent viability of proportionality 
challenges in noncapital cases.  452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (“Today the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits punishments which . . . are grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the crime.”).  Proportionality challenges also appeared alive and well in 
capital cases.  See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).  In Enmund, the Court 
considered 
whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty 
on one such as [petitioner] who aids and abets a felony in the course of 
which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, 
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be 
employed. 
Id. at 797.  In concluding that it does not, the Court surveyed (1) whether states 
allow for “the imposition of the death penalty for a vicarious felony murder in their 
capital sentencing statutes,” id. at 788–93; (2) the manner in which juries have 
reacted to the death penalty when the defendant is not the “triggerman,” id. at 794–
96; and (3) the “‘climate of international opinion,’” id. at 796 n.22 (quoting Coker, 
433 U.S. at 596 n.10); accord Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988); 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.35 (1958).  But cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 
361, 369 n.1 (1989) (“We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that 
are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici . . . 
that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant.”).  Although each 
instance revealed a uniform disapproval of capital punishment for vicarious felony 
murder, the Court separately interjected its own seemingly subjective analysis to 
conclude that petitioner’s punishment was unconstitutionally excessive.  See 
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798–801.  But cf. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.15 (“[N]o sentence 
of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund’s crime.”). 
122 463 U.S. at 280–81. 
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the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
petitioner’s crime was “one of the most passive felonies a person 
could commit.”123 
Although the Solem Court reiterated that “a criminal 
sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the 
defendant has been convicted,”124 it cautioned that successful 
challenges to the proportionality of noncapital cases would be 
“‘exceedingly rare.’”125  To clarify the specific utility of 
proportionality challenges in noncapital cases, the Court advised 
reviewing courts to consider, inter alia, certain “objective 
criteria,” including: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”126 
The Court recognized its list was not exhaustive and thus 
offered additional considerations: “[A] lesser included offense 
should not be punished more severely than the greater offense”; 
“an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher 
penalty than the principal”; “negligent conduct is less serious 
than intentional conduct”; and “[a] court . . . is entitled to look at 
a defendant’s motive in committing a crime.”127  The Court also 
highlighted the unique problem of applying Eighth Amendment 
proportionality challenges to terms of imprisonment: 
For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much 
one of ordering, but one of line-drawing.  It is clear that a 25-
year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 
but in most cases it would be difficult to decide that the former 
violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter does not.  
Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are not unique to 
 
123 Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that petitioner’s crime 
“involved neither violence nor threat of violence to any person”). 
124 Id. at 290.  “There is no basis for the State’s assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison sentences.”  Id. at 288. 
125 Id. at 289–90 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). 
126 Id. at 292.  The gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty inquiry 
tasks a court with considering the seriousness of the crime and comparing it to other 
crimes.  See id. at 291 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 597–98).  In the same jurisdiction, 
“[i]f more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, 
that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive.”  Id. at 291. 
127 Id. at 293; see id. at 296 (noting that “a State is justified in punishing a 
recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender”). 
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this area.  The courts are constantly called upon to draw 
similar lines in a variety of contexts.
128
 
Of course, as the dissent observed, the Court does not explain 
whether “all these factors [must] be present in order to hold a 
sentence excessive under the Eighth Amendment” or how the 
factors are “to be weighed against each other.”129 
In light of the stark conflict between Rummel and Solem,130 
the Court again confronted a proportionality challenge to a 
sentence of imprisonment in Harmelin v. Michigan.131  In 
Harmelin, the Court considered whether a life sentence without 
parole for cocaine possession, imposed upon a first-time 
offender, violated the offender’s Eighth Amendment rights.132  
Far from resolving the conflict, the Harmelin opinion further 
confused whether proportionality challenges to sentences of 
imprisonment remained viable.133  The Court, per Justice Scalia, 
held in Part IV of the opinion that petitioner’s sentence did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.  Justice Scalia reasoned that 
“[o]ur cases creating and clarifying the ‘individualized capital 
sentencing doctrine’ have repeatedly suggested that there is no 
comparable requirement outside the capital context, because of 
the qualitative difference between death and all other 
penalties.”134  The Court further reasoned that the phrase “cruel 
 
128 Id. at 294 (footnote omitted). 
129 Id. at 315 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
130 Compare id. at 288 n.13 (majority opinion) (“[The dissent’s] assertion that the 
Eighth Amendment establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is 
contrary to the entire line of cases cited in the text.”), with id. at 305 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the majority’s analysis is “completely at odds with the 
reasoning of our recent holding in Rummel”). 
131 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
132 Id. at 961–62. 
133 E.g., Drew v. Tessmer, 195 F. Supp. 2d 887, 890 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  In Drew, 
“[t]he magistrate judge quoted Harmelin v. Michigan for the notion that Weems 
does not announce a constitutional proportionality guarantee.”  Id. (citation and 
footnote omitted).  In correcting the magistrate’s error, the district court observed 
that “[a] more careful analysis of Harmelin, however, indicates that there is, in fact, 
a requirement of proportionality.”  Id. (noting that Part III of Justice Scalia’s 
opinion “carries little value . . . since the other seven Justices communicate that 
there is such a constitutional requirement”). 
134 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995.  The so-called “individualized sentencing doctrine,” 
as used in capital cases, requires “individualized determinations in capital-
sentencing proceedings.”  Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 75 (1987).  Thus, the 
doctrine prohibits mandatory capital-sentencing provisions and constitutionally 
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and unusual” was historically designed to prohibit certain 
punishments, but not to guarantee proportionate sentencing.135 
A majority of Justices only agreed on Part IV of the Court’s 
opinion.  Seven Justices found the preceding three parts of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion objectionable;136 indeed, only Chief 
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia in announcing, “Solem 
was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no 
proportionality guarantee.”137  Justice Scalia reasoned that the 
totality of factors proposed by the Solem Court to aid in the 
proportionality analysis presents “an invitation to imposition of 
subjective values.”138  Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the 
Eighth Amendment provides for proportionate sentencing only 
in the context of capital punishment, if at all.139 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, 
authored a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment, in which he observed, “the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause encompasses a narrow proportionality 
principle.”140  Although Justice Kennedy conceded that the 
majority of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence emerged from 
death penalty cases, he nonetheless reaffirmed that “[t]he Eighth 
Amendment proportionality principle also applies to noncapital 
sentences.”141  According to Justice Kennedy, the Amendment 
provides only a limited proportionality guarantee and thus “does 
not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence.  
Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the crime.”142  To clarify and apparently 
streamline his proportionality analysis in relation to Solem, 
Justice Kennedy indicated that a reviewing court’s evaluation of 
the first Solem factor–the gravity of the offense and the 
 
guarantees to the defendant the ability to present any relevant mitigating evidence 
before the sentencing authority can impose death.  Id. at 76. 
135 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 992–93. 
136 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, separately 
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.  Justices White, Blackmun, 
Stevens, and Marshall dissented. 
137 Id. at 965. 
138 See id. at 986. 
139 Id. at 994. 
140 Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
141 Id. (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)). 
142 Id. at 1001. 
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harshness of the penalty–“may be sufficient to determine the 
constitutionality of a particular sentence.”143  Accordingly, 
“intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses [Solem 
factors two and three] are appropriate only in the rare case in 
which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.”144 
Writing for the dissent, Justice White revisited the Court’s 
previous Eighth Amendment decisions that, he concluded, 
reflect a consistent recognition of a proportionality principle.145  
Justice White asserted that to evaluate a proportionality 
challenge to a sentence of imprisonment, the factor test outlined 
in Solem objectively assesses “a given sentence’s constitutional 
proportionality, giving due deference to ‘public attitudes 
concerning a particular sentence.’”146  In contrast, Justice White 
argued, Justice Scalia’s approach relied too heavily on a 
historical analysis147 without addressing prior Court precedent.148  
The dissenters also disapproved of Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
and asserted that his streamlined approach to proportionality 
directly contradicted the Solem Court’s directive that “‘no one 
factor will be dispositive in a given case,’ and ‘no single criterion 
can identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it 
violates the Eighth Amendment,’ ‘[b]ut a combination of 
objective factors can make such analysis possible.’”149  Thus, 
according to the dissent, Justice Scalia delivered “a swift death 
sentence to Solem” and Justice Kennedy “prefer[red] to 
eviscerate it, leaving only an empty shell.”150 
Since Harmelin, the Court has not had occasion to specify the 
extent to which the Eighth Amendment guarantees 
 
143 Id. at 1004. 
144 Id. at 1005. 
145 Id. at 1012 (White, J., dissenting). 
146 Id. at 1021. 
147 Id. at 1011 n.1.  Moreover, the dissent recognized, “the Court’s jurisprudence 
concerning the scope of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments has 
long understood the limitations of a purely historical analysis.”  Id. at 1014. 
148 See id. at 1013 (“Not only is it undeniable that our cases have construed the 
Eighth Amendment to embody a proportionality component, but it is also evident 
that none of the Court’s cases suggest that such a construction is impermissible.”). 
149 Id. at 1019 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 n.17 (1983)). 
150 Id. at 1018. 
GALLINI.FMT 12/8/2008  11:01:36 AM 
56 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 29 
proportionate sentencing in noncapital cases.  But the Court 
seemingly adopted Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin 
as the lens through which to view Eighth Amendment challenges 
to terms of imprisonment.151  Indeed, in Ewing v. California,152 a 
Court plurality affirmed the constitutionality of petitioner’s 
sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison pursuant to 
California’s Three Strikes law.153  In doing so, the Court rejected 
petitioner’s argument that his sentence was grossly 
disproportionate to his most recent crime–grand theft of golf 
clubs valued at roughly $1200.154  In weighing the gravity of 
petitioner’s offense,155 the Court held that petitioner’s sentence 
did not raise an inference of gross disproportionality, citing both 
his current offense and long history of felony recidivism.156  It 
 
151 E.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003) (“The proportionality 
principles in our cases distilled in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence guide our 
application of the Eighth Amendment in the new context that we are called upon to 
consider.”).  The Court’s approach comports with the interpretation of Harmelin 
adopted by a majority of Circuit Courts.  See, e.g., Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 
706, 709 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Since Harmelin, our court and others have applied the 
principles outlined in Mr. Justice Kennedy’s opinion to [Eighth Amendment]    
cases . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We have 
ruled that Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion . . . sets forth the applicable Eighth 
Amendment test.”); United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“Our court follows the narrow proportionality rule established by Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin . . . .”); United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (“In reviewing Eighth Amendment challenges, this circuit has adhered to 
the ‘narrow proportionality principle’ articulated in Harmelin v. Michigan.” 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128–29 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(calling Justice Kennedy’s test “the holding in Harmelin” because it is the “position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest 
grounds”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
152 538 U.S. at 11. 
153 Id. at 20. 
154 Id. at 17–18.  Petitioner stole the clubs while on parole from a nine-year prison 
term for first-degree robbery and multiple counts of residential burglary.  Id.  His 
subsequent conviction was his fifteenth, for which he had previously served nine 
separate terms of incarceration.  Id. at 18. 
155 By weighing the gravity of petitioner’s offense, the Court’s analysis suggests a 
tacit return to the Solem factors.  Yet, as the Kennedy concurrence in Harmelin 
observed, Solem “did not mandate” a subsequent comparative analysis “within and 
between jurisdictions.”  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
156 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (noting that petitioner’s crime was “certainly not ‘one of 
the most passive felonies a person could commit’” (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 296 (1983))). 
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specifically observed that petitioner’s lengthy criminal history 
reflected a pattern of increasing violence.157 
Similarly, in Lockyer v. Andrade,158 a federal habeas corpus 
proceeding, the Court rejected a gross disproportionality claim 
from petitioner who stole videotapes worth $153 from two K-
Mart stores on separate occasions in November 1995.159  
Petitioner Andrade was sentenced, in light of his prior theft-
related offenses,160 to two consecutive Three Strikes sentences of 
twenty-five years to life, with no eligibility for parole until he 
served fifty years in prison.161  The Supreme Court held that 
because “the precise contours” of the gross disproportionality 
principle were “unclear,” the state court of appeals made an 
objectively reasonable application of clearly established federal 
law by upholding petitioner’s sentence.162  Indeed, reasoned the 
Court, legislatures enjoy broad discretion in crafting appropriate 
sentences for recidivists; thus, given petitioner’s lengthy prior 
record, the state court of appeals appropriately concluded that 
petitioner’s sentence was not an “extraordinary case” producing 
an unconstitutional sentence.163 
The foregoing decisions suggest that non-habeas corpus 
defendants sentenced to life in prison without parole have two 
ways to challenge their sentence pursuant to the Eighth 
Amendment.164  First, such a defendant may argue that, pursuant 
to Trop v. Dulles, the punishment is unconstitutional because the 
 
157 Id. at 29–30. 
158 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
159 Id. at 66. 
160 Petitioner’s criminal history included the following activities: multiple counts 
of burglary, for which he was sentenced to 120 months in prison; misdemeanor 
theft, for which he was sentenced to six days in jail with a year of probation; 
transportation of marijuana, for which he was sentenced to eight years in federal 
prison; misdemeanor theft, for which he was sentenced to 180 days in jail; and 
transportation of marijuana, for which he was sentenced to 2191 days in federal 
prison.  Id. at 66–67.  He was also arrested for a state parole violation arising from 
his escape from federal prison.  Id. at 67. 
161 Id. at 66. 
162 Id. at 72–73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Through this thicket of 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, one governing legal principle emerges as ‘clearly 
established’ under § 2254(d)(1): A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to 
sentences for terms of years.”  Id. at 72). 
163 Id. at 76–77. 
164 Accord Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1996); Foster v. Withrow, 
159 F. Supp. 2d 629, 644 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
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“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society” reject it.165  This defendant therefore bears a 
heavy burden to demonstrate that the evolving standards of 
decency disallow the challenged punishment by relying on the 
enactments from state legislatures nationwide.166  In considering 
a defendant’s challenge to a life without parole sentence, a 
reviewing court must specifically consider: (1) whether a 
nationwide consensus favors the challenged punishment,167 (2) 
the extent to which the behavior of juries and prosecutors invoke 
the challenged punishment,168 (3) its own judgment by focusing 
on whether the challenged punishment furthers legitimate 
penological goals,169 and (4) the climate of international law.170 
Second, that same defendant alternatively could proffer a 
proportionality argument.171  Today, an evaluation of this 
challenge requires a mix of Solem, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Harmelin, and the considerations prevalent in 
both Ewing and Lockyer.172  Any analysis must focus on 
 
165 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
166 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369–71 (1989). 
167 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370; 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 n.7 (1988). 
168 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 n.7; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373; see Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (noting that jury determinations and 
legislative enactments are “two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency 
respecting the imposition of punishment in our society”). 
169 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 n.8 (citing Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1987)). 
170 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–78; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830. 
171 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  Significantly, “[f]ederal courts will not engage in a proportionality 
analysis except in cases where the penalty imposed is death or life in prison without 
possibility of parole.”  United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1995). 
172 Before Solem, state courts often utilized a variety of subjective standards.  See, 
e.g., Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1968) (evaluating punishment by 
examining whether it is “completely arbitrary” and “shocking to the sense of 
justice”); State v. Espinosa, 421 P.2d 322, 325 (Ariz. 1966) (evaluating punishment 
by asking whether it is “approximately proportionate to the type of crime and not 
so severe as to shock the moral sense of the community”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930 (Cal. 1972) (holding that a punishment is 
constitutionally disproportionate if it “shocks the conscience and offends 
fundamental notions of human dignity”); Normand v. People, 440 P.2d 282, 284 
(Colo. 1968) (upholding punishment “where it does not shock the conscience of the 
court”); State v. Evans, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (Idaho 1952) (invalidating sentences if 
they are so disproportionate “as to shock the conscience of reasonable men”); 
Cannon v. Gladden, 281 P.2d 233, 235 (Or. 1955) (holding that a punishment is 
unconstitutional if it would “shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what 
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“objective factors” and begin with evaluating the “gravity of the 
offense and the harshness of the penalty.”173  As Ewing and 
Lockyer make clear, this requires a reviewing court to consider 
both the crime’s severity and defendant’s criminal history.174  
Unless defendant’s sentence leads to an inference of 
disproportionality, the inquiry likely ends there.175 
Assuming defendant’s crime is nonviolent or otherwise 
passive,176 however, a reviewing court may evaluate the 
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction 
(the “inter-jurisdictional” analysis),177 and the sentences imposed 
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions (the 
“intra-jurisdictional” analysis).178  In doing so, a court must be 
mindful of the additional Solem pronouncements.179  The Solem 
factors, however, are rarely helpful because “[o]utside the 
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the 
proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly 
rare.”180 
 
is right and proper”).  Notwithstanding the Solem decision, at least one court 
continued using a subjective standard.  Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d 325, 
331 (Mass. 1992) (invalidating a punishment that “shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  But see State v. Bonner, 577 N.W.2d 575, 579 (S.D. 1998) (rejecting the 
“shocks the conscience” test and employing the set of principles articulated in 
Justice Kennedy’s Harmelin concurrence). 
173 See Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277, 290–91 (1983) (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 
597–98). 
174 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003). 
175 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring); accord James v. 
Kernan, No. C 03-0020, 2007 WL 879071, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007) (“The 
threshold for an ‘inference of gross disproportionality’ is quite high.” (citing Ewing, 
538 U.S. at 30)). 
176 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (evaluating whether petitioner’s crime was a 
“passive felony”); Solem, 463 U.S. at 296 (same). 
177 Solem, 463 U.S. at 291. 
178 Id. at 292. 
179 Id. at 293–94. 
180 Id. at 289–90 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted).  The Court’s words were indeed prophetic; successful 
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are exceedingly rare.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Cupa-Guillen, 34 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] sentence 
within the limits set by a valid statute may not be overturned on appeal as cruel and 
unusual punishment unless the sentence is so ‘grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime’ as to shock our sense of justice.” (quoting United States v. 
Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1979))); United States v. Atteberry, 447 
F.3d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A sentence within the statutory limits is generally 
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B.  Juvenile Offenders, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court 
Historically, the Supreme Court has accommodated for the 
differences between children and adults by affording children 
greater legal protection.181  Due to children’s underdeveloped 
maturity, poor rationality, and their adult potential, reviewing 
courts traditionally have given children special consideration 
when determining whether their sentences violate the Eighth 
 
not subject to [Eighth Amendment] review.” (alteration in original)); United States 
v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the “Eighth 
Amendment condemns only punishment that shocks the collective conscience of 
society”); see also Kathi A. Drew & R. K. Weaver, Disproportionate or Excessive 
Punishments: Is There a Method for Successful Constitutional Challenges?, 2 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 19 (1995) (“In the literally hundreds of cases dealing with 
proportionality since Harmelin, the federal courts have not declared a single prison 
sentence to be disproportionate.”).  But cf. Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 
2004).  In Ramirez, defendant was caught walking out of a Sears department store 
in broad daylight carrying a $199 VCR for which he had not paid.  Id. at 756.  
Although defendant immediately surrendered to authorities and returned the VCR 
(and the state could have charged him with a misdemeanor), the prosecution 
charged him with one count of petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction 
(defendant had a prior record).  Id.  After his conviction, defendant was sentenced 
to life pursuant to California’s “Three Strikes” law.  Id.  After considering the 
objective factors of defendant’s case and performing the fact-specific analysis of his 
criminal history, the court held that this was an “exceedingly rare” case in which the 
sentence imposed was grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed and 
therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 762–75. 
 The court’s decision in Ramirez, however, clearly represents an isolated instance.  
Indeed, the great majority of cases reject defendants’ Eighth Amendment 
proportionality challenges.  See, e.g., Little v. Butler, 848 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(holding twenty-five-year sentence for attempted armed robbery not 
disproportionate); United States v. Oglesby, 764 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(holding same for twenty-year sentence for armed robbery); Hanks v. Jackson, 123 
F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1075 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding same for twenty- to fifty-year 
sentence for armed robbery); Atkins v. Overton, 843 F. Supp. 258, 261–62 (E.D. 
Mich. 1994) (holding same for ten- to thirty-year sentence for armed robbery). 
181 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“Children, by definition, 
are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.”); Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (“Our history is replete with laws and 
judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less 
mature and responsible than adults.”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 636 (1979) 
(reviewing and reiterating “the Court’s concern over the inability of children to 
make mature choices”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (noting that “a 
state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with 
children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized”); Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629, 649–50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (observing that children 
do not possess “full capacity for individual choice”). 
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Amendment.182  Three cases in particular best trace the Court’s 
approach to juvenile criminal defendants. 
1.  Thompson v. Oklahoma 
In 1988, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that children hold a 
“very special place in life”183 in Thompson v. Oklahoma,184 
wherein a fifteen-year-old boy and three others “actively 
participated” in the murder of petitioner’s former brother-in-
law.185  The victim was shot twice; his throat, chest, and abdomen 
were cut; he had several bruises and a broken leg; and his body 
was chained to a concrete block and thrown in a river.186  
Petitioner was sentenced to death for his role and, after the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to consider, in part,187 whether a death 
sentence is cruel and unusual punishment for a fifteen-year-old 
who participated in a murder.188 
In holding that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age 
at the time of his or her offense,” a Court plurality considered 
whether contemporary standards of decency allowed a juvenile 
to act with the degree of culpability that justifies capital 
punishment.189  To facilitate its Trop analysis,190 the Court 
 
182 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988). 
183 Id. at 825 n.23 (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
184 Id. at 815. 
185 Id. at 819 (declining to delineate petitioner’s specific role in the offense). 
186 Id. at 819. 
187 At the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor admitted three 
photographs depicting the victim’s condition upon his removal from the river.  Id. at 
820.  The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the admission of two of 
the photographs–although erroneous–was nonetheless harmless because of the 
overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s guilt.  Id.  The prosecutor, however, also 
used the photographs in his closing argument at the penalty phase; the Oklahoma 
court did not consider the propriety of this practice.  Id.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
was also asked to review “whether photographic evidence that a state court deems 
erroneously admitted but harmless at the guilt phase nevertheless violates a capital 
defendant’s constitutional rights by virtue of its being considered at the penalty 
phase.”  Id. at 820–21.  Given the Court’s resolution of the Eighth Amendment 
issue, however, it declined to consider this second question.  Id. at 838 n.48. 
188 Id. at 820–21. 
189 Id. at 822–23, 838.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, authored the plurality opinion; Justice O’Connor separately concurred; 
and Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and White, dissented. 
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examined legislative enactments, jury sentences,191 and 
recognized that ultimately its own judgment would determine 
“the acceptability of the death penalty” in this instance.192 
The Court first considered pertinent legislative enactments 
and observed that Oklahoma, like several other states, prohibits 
minors from (1) voting, (2) sitting on a jury, (3) marrying 
without parental consent, and (4) purchasing alcohol or 
cigarettes.193  Additionally, Oklahoma retains a juvenile-justice 
system in which most offenders under age eighteen are not held 
criminally responsible for their actions.194  The Court closely 
surveyed state law to explore how other states treat minors in 
relation to voting, jury service, driving privileges, marriage, the 
purchase of pornographic materials, gambling, and the 
maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction.195  Taken together, 
the Court reasoned, “[a]ll of this legislation is consistent with the 
experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, 
that the normal 15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full 
responsibilities of an adult.”196 
 
190 Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, the Court presumably declined 
to engage in a strict proportionality analysis because “there [was] no claim that the 
punishment would be excessive if the crime had been committed by an adult.”  Id. 
at 819.  But cf. id. at 853 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing Part V of the 
plurality opinion for employing a “kind of disproportionality analysis”). 
191 Id. at 822 n.7 (plurality opinion). 
192 Id. at 823 n.8 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)). 
193 Id. at 823. 
194 Id. at 823–24.  The Court did, however, observe that Oklahoma considers a 
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old charged with murder (or other serious felonies) an 
adult and, using a “special certification procedure,” defendants who are petitioner’s 
age could similarly be charged as an adult.  Id. at 824. 
195 Id. at 824–25. 
196 Id.  But cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (“It is, to begin 
with, absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive carefully, to drink 
responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature enough to understand 
that murdering another human being is profoundly wrong, and to conform one’s 
conduct to that most minimal of all civilized standards.”). 
 The Court subsequently examined the minimum age for the imposition of capital 
punishment and realized that, of the eighteen states “that have expressly established 
a minimum age in their death penalty statutes, . . . all of them require that the 
defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense.”  
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.  The Court thereafter confirmed the wisdom of state 
law by reflecting on international customs and noted, “The conclusion that it would 
offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years 
old at the time of [the] offense is consistent with . . . other nations that share our 
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Second, the Court investigated the “behavior of juries” to 
determine whether the death penalty was administered to 
juveniles in an unguided fashion.197  Statistics from the 
Department of Justice revealed a startling reality: of the 1392 
defendants sentenced to death between 1982 and 1986, only five 
(including petitioner) were less than sixteen years old at the time 
of their offense.198  According to the Court, “[s]tatistics of this 
kind . . . suggest that these five young offenders have received 
sentences that are ‘cruel and unusual in the same way that being 
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.’”199 
Finally, the Court exercised its own judgment to conclude that 
sentencing petitioner to death violated the Eighth 
Amendment.200  In doing so, the Court emphasized that a 
juvenile’s criminal behavior should not be measured using adult 
standards.201  Unlike adults, juveniles–including adolescents–
exhibit less maturity and responsibility.202  Justice Stevens 
succinctly articulated: 
[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a 
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult.  
The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended 
explanation.  Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence 
make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of 
his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much 
more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure 
than is an adult.  The reasons why juveniles are not trusted 
with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain 
why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible 
as that of an adult.
203
 
 
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European 
community.”  Id. at 830. 
197 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831. 
198 Id. at 832–33. 
199 Id. at 833 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)). 
200 Id. at 833–38.  Notwithstanding a self-described exercise of its own judgment, 
the Court constrained its inquiry to evaluating first whether juveniles and adults 
should be held to equivalent standards and, second, whether administering capital 
punishment to juveniles facilitates the societal purposes underlying the death 
penalty.  Id. at 833. 
201 Id. at 833–38. 
202 Id. at 834. 
203 Id. at 835 (footnotes omitted). 
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2.  Stanford v. Kentucky 
One year after its decision in Thompson, the Court in 
Stanford v. Kentucky204 considered whether imposing capital 
punishment on individuals for crimes committed at sixteen or 
seventeen constituted cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 
the Eighth Amendment.  The Stanford petitioners argued that 
sentencing them to death would violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments because they were juveniles at the time of their 
crimes.205  Specifically, they contended, pursuant to Trop, that 
“their punishment is contrary to the ‘evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”206 
To evaluate petitioners’ challenges, the Court again turned 
first to state and federal legislative enactments.  Of the thirty-
seven states that authorized capital punishment, fifteen states 
refused to impose the death penalty on sixteen-year-olds and 
twelve states refused to impose it on seventeen-year-olds.207  
This, according to the Court, was insufficient to establish “the 
degree of national consensus . . . previously thought sufficient to 
label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.”208  Although 
no federal death penalty for sixteen- or seventeen-year-old 
offenders existed, the Court viewed this as insufficient to 
demonstrate a national consensus against using capital 
punishment for sixteen- or seventeen-year-old juvenile 
defendants.209 
 
204 492 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1989).  Specifically, the Stanford Court considered the 
cases of two juvenile murder defendants from Kentucky and Missouri, respectively.  
The first, seventeen-year-old Kevin Stanford, was convicted of murder, first-degree 
sodomy, first-degree robbery, and receiving stolen property, and was sentenced to 
death and forty-five years in prison after he and an accomplice: (1) repeatedly raped 
and sodomized a gas station attendant; (2) robbed the gas station; and (3) drove the 
attendant to a secluded area near the station where Stanford shot her in the face 
and in the back of the head.  Id. at 365–66.  The second defendant, sixteen-year-old 
Heath Wilkins, fatally stabbed a twenty-six-year-old mother of two who was 
working behind the sales counter of the convenience store she and her husband 
owned and operated in Missouri.  Id. at 366. 
205 Id. at 368. 
206 Id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
207 Id. at 370. 
208 Id. at 370–71. 
209 Id. at 372–73. 
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Petitioners nonetheless argued that contemporary societal 
attitudes showed juries’ reluctance to impose the death penalty 
on sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds and a corresponding 
prosecutorial reluctance to seek such sentences.210  For support, 
petitioners relied on statistics reflecting that, from 1982 to 1988, 
only fifteen of 2106 death sentences were imposed on sixteen-
year-old offenders and only thirty on defendants who were 
seventeen at the time of their offense.211  The Court dismissed 
these statistics and relied on “the undisputed fact that a far 
smaller percentage of capital crimes are committed by persons 
under 18 than over 18.”212 
At this point, the Stanford Court’s approach differed from the 
Thompson Court.  In a last-ditch effort, petitioners urged the 
Court to exercise its “own informed judgment” to hold that 
imposing the death penalty in this context would not serve 
legitimate penological goals because it would fail to deter 
juveniles.213  In response, the Court observed that petitioners’ 
argument has no place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and, 
unlike in Thompson, “emphatically reject[ed]” petitioners’ 
request for the Court to exercise its own judgment.214  The Court 
concluded that no historical or current national consensus 
existed against capital punishment for sixteen- or seventeen-
 
210 Id. at 373. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 374. 
213 Id. at 377–78 (quotation marks omitted).  Petitioners also attempted to 
demonstrate a national consensus against capital punishment for sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-old offenders by offering “public opinion polls, the views of interest 
groups, and the positions adopted by various professional associations.”  Id. at 377.  
Such evidence, however, has no role in determining the constitutionality of 
punishment; indeed, only through the judgments of legislatures could petitioners 
establish the requisite national consensus.  Id. 
214 Id. at 378.  But cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 (1988) (“‘[I]t is 
for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the 
death penalty’ on one such as petitioner who committed a heinous murder when he 
was only 15 years old.” (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982))).  
The Court’s decision in Stanford not to exercise its own judgment now appears 
anomalous.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (“[T]o the extent 
Stanford was based on a rejection of the idea that this Court is required to bring its 
independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a 
particular class of crimes or offenders, . . . it suffices to note that this rejection was 
inconsistent with prior Eighth Amendment decisions.” (citations omitted)); Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (“[I]n cases involving a consensus, our own 
judgment is ‘brought to bear’ by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the 
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (citation omitted)). 
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year-old murderers and, as a result, imposing such a sentence 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.215 
3.  Roper v. Simmons 
To resolve the conflict between Thompson and Stanford, the 
Court revisited the relationship between juvenile punishment 
and the Eighth Amendment in Roper v. Simmons.216  At the age 
of seventeen, respondent Christopher Simmons217 entered the 
victim’s home with an accomplice after dark and used duct tape 
to cover the victim’s eyes and mouth and bind her hands.218  
They then put the victim in her own minivan and drove her to a 
state park where they walked her to a railroad trestle and threw 
her from the bridge.219  Within days, authorities received 
information that led to respondent’s arrest, confession, and 
videotaped reenactment of the crime.220  Following a jury trial, 
respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death.221 
 
215 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.  Ultimately, neither petitioner was executed.  In 
June 2003, then-Kentucky Governor Paul Patton commuted Kevin Stanford’s death 
sentence to life in prison.  See Andrew Wolfson, Patton Pardons 4 in Election Case 
and Will Commute Death Sentence; Stanford’s Family Celebrates; Victim’s Sister Is 
Repulsed, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 19, 2003, at 1A (announcing 
commutation of Stanford’s sentence but declining to specify the terms); Andrew 
Wolfson, Governor Will Spare Jefferson Killer’s Life, COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 26, 2003, at 6A (announcing formal terms of commutation). 
 Earlier, on May 16, 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri ordered the State to allow Heath Wilkins to withdraw his plea of guilty.  
Wilkins v. Bowersox, 933 F. Supp. 1496, 1526 (W.D. Mo. 1996), aff’d, 145 F.3d 1006 
(8th Cir. 1998).  The court held that Wilkins was not mentally competent when he 
waived his right to counsel.  Id. at 1515.  Wilkins subsequently received three 
consecutive life sentences after pleading guilty in Clay County Circuit Court to 
second-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed criminal action.  Associated 
Press, Youngest Ever Sent to Death Row Gets Three Life Sentences, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, May 22, 1999, at 17. 
216 543 U.S. at 551. 
217 Testimony during a postconviction hearing revealed that respondent was 
immature, impulsive, and easily influenced.  Id. at 559.  Evidently, respondent also 
endured a difficult childhood and performed poorly in school as a teenager.  Id.  
Although respondent was also a frequent alcohol and drug user, id., he had no 
criminal record prior to committing murder, id. at 558. 
218 Id. at 556. 
219 Id. at 556–57. 
220 Id. at 557. 
221 Id. at 557–58. 
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As Simmons submitted a series of failed post conviction filings 
in state appellate court,222 the Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Atkins v. Virginia,223 wherein it held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a mentally 
retarded person.224  Based on the reasoning of Atkins, 
respondent filed a new petition for state postconviction relief, 
contending that the Constitution precluded executing a juvenile 
who was under eighteen at the time of the crime.225  The 
Missouri Supreme Court agreed and resentenced respondent to 
 
222 Id. at 558–59. 
223 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
224 Id. at 321.  Initially, the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a categorical 
exemption from the death penalty for the mentally retarded.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302, 340 (1989).  In reaching this conclusion, the Penry Court stressed that only 
two states had enacted laws banning the imposition of the death penalty on a 
mentally retarded person convicted of a capital offense.  Id. at 334.  Yet, when 
revisiting the issue in Atkins, the Court reached the opposite conclusion.  Relying 
on the changed legal landscape, the court observed that “[t]he practice . . . has 
become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed 
against it.”  536 U.S. at 316. 
 Interestingly, despite the Court’s Atkins opinion, the petitioner in Penry, Johnny 
Paul Penry, still faced the possibility of execution until earlier this year.  Mike 
Tolson, Penry’s Fate to Be Weighed a 4th Time; He’s Set to Face a Jury in June for 
Sentencing in ’79 Murder, HOUSTON CHRON., May 14, 2007, at B1.  After navigating 
nearly three decades worth of legal twists and turns, Penry finally reached an 
agreement with prosecutors in February 2008 to serve three consecutive life 
sentences.  Mike Tolson, An End to a Legal Saga: Deal Keeps Penry Imprisoned for 
Life, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb 16, 2008, at B1.  As part of the agreement, Penry’s 
lawyers agreed that Penry was competent to stand trial and that at all times during 
the criminal proceedings he was not mentally retarded.  Elizabeth White, State 
Won’t Seek Death Penalty Against Convicted Killer, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16, 
2008. 
 Interestingly, since Atkins, the petitioner Daryl Atkins has not left death row.  
David G. Savage, IQ Debate Unsettled in Death Penalty Cases; The Supreme Court 
Ruled Against Executing the Mentally Retarded, but Defining that Group has Proved 
Difficult, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at A1.  Although, as noted, the Atkins decision 
prohibits the execution of mentally retarded defendants, prosecutors in Atkins 
remain focused on proving that Atkins is not mentally retarded.  Id.  In August 
2007, lawyers for Atkins were scheduled to try again to convince a jury that Atkins 
is mentally retarded and “therefore deserves a life term in prison, not execution.”  
Id.  Before that hearing could occur, however, Atkins’ sentence was commuted to 
life when his codefendant’s attorney came forward with his belief that prosecutors 
committed misconduct by coaching a witness and hiding it from the defense at the 
time of Atkins’s trial.  Donna St. George, Death Sentence Commuted in Va. Case; 
Prosecutor Action is Issue, Not Mental Status of Defendant, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 
2008, at B1.  Prosecutors have since appealed the commutation of Atkins’ sentence.  
Danielle Zielinski, Atkins Will Remain on Death Row Pending Appeal, DAILY 
PRESS (Newport, Va.), Feb. 7, 2008. 
225 Roper, 543 U.S. at 559. 
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life in prison without parole, after which the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.226 
In affirming the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit executing individuals under the age of 
eighteen.227  Like the analysis in Thompson and Stanford, the 
Roper Court began by examining the constitutionality of a 
juvenile death penalty by considering the “national 
consensus.”228  In reviewing legislative changes since Stanford, 
the Court observed that “[f]ive [s]tates that allowed the juvenile 
death penalty at the time of Stanford have abandoned it in the 
intervening fifteen years–four through legislative enactments 
and one through judicial decision.”229  Although such changes 
reflected a “less dramatic” trend than in Atkins, the Court 
nonetheless viewed the development as significant, particularly 
when considered alongside the infrequent use of juvenile capital 
punishment in states that allow the practice.230  Taken together, 
the evidence reflected that juveniles are “‘categorically less 
culpable than the average criminal.’”231 
Unlike the Thompson and Stanford Courts, the Roper Court 
did not consider the attitudes of contemporary society through 
jury verdicts and the actions of prosecutors.  Instead, the Court 
directly exercised its own judgment to demonstrate why the 
death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.232  
To prove that juveniles cannot be classified among the worst 
offenders, the Roper Court, like the Thompson Court, 
highlighted differences between adults and juveniles: (1) 
 
226 Id. at 560. 
227 Id. at 578.  The Court’s decision in Roper evidently resonated most in Texas, 
which houses more than one-third of the country’s convicts who were sentenced to 
death for crimes they committed as juveniles.  Maro Robbins, Justices Rule Teen 
Killers Can’t Be Put to Death; Decision Could Have the Biggest Impact on Texas, 
Which Has the Most Kids Sentenced to Be Executed, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, March 2, 2005, at A1. 
228 543 U.S. at 564. 
229 Id. at 565. 
230 Id. at 565, 566–67. 
231 Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316) (2002). 
232 The Atkins Court likewise followed this approach.  536 U.S. at 313 (“[W]e 
shall first review the judgment of legislatures that have addressed the suitability of 
imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded and then consider reasons for 
agreeing or disagreeing with their judgment.”). 
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juveniles lack the maturity of adults and possess an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) juveniles are more 
susceptible to peer pressure, and (3) “the character of a juvenile 
is not as well formed as that of an adult.”233  Thus, according to 
the Court, “[o]nce the diminished culpability of juveniles is 
recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the 
death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”234 
Finally, the Court considered, for the first time in detail, the 
climate of international law.  The Court observed that Article 37 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child–
ratified by every country except the United States and 
Somalia–expressly prohibits capital punishment for juvenile 
offenders under age eighteen.235  Only seven countries other 
than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 
1990 and, since then, these countries have either abolished 
capital punishment or publicly renounced the practice.236  
Although its examination of international law was not 
dispositive, the Court concluded that “[t]he opinion of the world 
community . . . provide[s] respected and significant confirmation 
for our own conclusions.”237 
And, yet, the foregoing cases leave unclear the manner in 
which the Court might evaluate a juvenile’s proportionality 
challenge.238  Some anecdotal language from the Court’s 
opinions suggests that a juvenile accomplice convicted of felony 
murder could not proffer a proportionality challenge to a 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.239  
 
233 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
234 Id. at 571. 
235 Id. at 576. 
236 Id. at 577. 
237 Id. at 578. 
238 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (noting “that our precedents 
in this area have not been a model of clarity” (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 965 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.))).  “Indeed, in determining whether a 
particular sentence for a term of years can violate the Eighth Amendment, we have 
not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow.”  Id. (citing Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11, 20–23 (2003)). 
239 Compare Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (“[Petitioner] did not 
kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the 
robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to [petitioner] 
the culpability of those who killed the [victims].  This was impermissible under the 
Eighth Amendment.”), with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.15 (1983) (“[N]o 
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That said, however, the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion 
to consider such a challenge and, more specifically, a challenge 
from a minimal-role juvenile murder accomplice who, for 
example, participated by serving as a mere lookout.240  Given the 
potential uncertainty surrounding the viability of this challenge, 
this Article will assume for purposes of discussion that only in a 
narrow set of circumstances, discussed in Part III below, might a 
juvenile proffer a proportionality challenge to a sentence of life 
in prison following a murder conviction. 
C.  Applying the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence to Juvenile Punishment in the Lower Courts 
Authors have widely discussed the evolving philosophies 
underlying the existence of the juvenile court system241 and its 
increasingly harsh juvenile penalties.242  Some commentators 
contend that the imposition of harsher juvenile penalties began 
in response to a perceived increase in juvenile crime.243  Others 
 
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund’s crime [of 
felony-murder].”). 
240 Compare People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 308 (Ill. 2002) (reversing life 
sentence for juvenile murder accomplice), with Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 912, 
918 (Miss. 1995) (upholding trial court’s sentence of life imprisonment for fourteen-
year-old who aided and abetted murder).  Both of these cases are subsequently 
discussed in more depth. 
241 See, e.g., Marisa Slaten, Note, Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court: Whose 
Right Is It Anyway?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 824–26 (2003); Mary E. Spring, 
Comment, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to the 
Problem of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1356–58 
(1998).  A majority of commentators agree that the juvenile justice system shifted 
from rehabilitation to retribution, the goal of the criminal justice system, following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).  See, 
e.g., Jon-Michael Foxworth, An Unjust Act: The Schizophrenic State of Maturity and 
Culpability in Juvenile Justice and Minor Abortion Rights Law; Recent Trends in 
Virginia and Nationally, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 498 (2003); Lynda E. 
Frost & Adrienne E. Volenick, The Ethical Perils of Representing the Juvenile 
Defendant Who May Be Incompetent, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 327, 332 (2004); 
Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375, 390 
(1996). 
242 E.g., Judith L. Hunter, They Grow Up So Fast: When Juveniles Commit Adult 
Crimes: A Dilemma for the Juvenile System, 29 AKRON L. REV. 473, 473–74 (1996) 
(noting rise in violent crime committed by youth). 
243 See Jarod K. Hofacket, Justice or Vengeance: How Young Is Too Young for a 
Child to Be Tried and Punished As an Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 159, 164 
(2002); Hon. W. Don Reader, They Grow Up So Fast: When Juveniles Commit 
Adult Crimes: The Laws of Unintended Results, 29 AKRON L. REV. 477, 480 (1996). 
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maintain that juvenile institutions were largely unable to 
rehabilitate juveniles effectively.244  Regardless of the reason for 
harsher penalties, a review of the judiciary’s approach reflects a 
dynamic shift in favor of upholding the more severe punishment 
of juveniles convicted of heinous felonies.  Indeed, as the 
philosophy behind the juvenile system of justice has changed, so 
too have prevailing attitudes in the judiciary. 
Whether life in prison without the possibility of parole is a 
constitutionally permissible sentence for juveniles, for a time, 
seemed an open question.  In 1968, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court squarely held, in Workman v. Commonwealth,245 that life 
imprisonment without the benefit of parole is cruel and unusual 
punishment when applied to juvenile offenders.246  In Workman, 
two fourteen-year-old defendants forcibly raped a seventy-one-
year-old woman, after which they were convicted and sentenced 
to life in prison without the possibility of parole.247  The court 
held that this punishment was “cruel and unusual” by reasoning 
“that life imprisonment without benefit of parole for two 
fourteen-year-old youths under all the circumstances shocks the 
general conscience of society today and is intolerable to 
fundamental fairness.”248  In tacitly highlighting a juvenile’s 
potential for rehabilitation, the court further reasoned that “it is 
impossible to make a judgment that a fourteen-year-old youth, 
no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his 
life.”249 
Over the following eleven years, a series of state court 
opinions suggested that Workman would stand as an anomalous 
decision.250  For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in 1974, 
 
244 See Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Note, Sentence Blending and the Promise of 
Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
259, 266 (1999). 
245 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968). 
246 Id. at 378.  The Kentucky Supreme Court later remarked that the Workman 
decision “was not whimsical” and “was based on the fact that juveniles have 
historically been labeled as a separate class.  We think the distinction is a rational 
one.”  Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Ky. 1974). 
247 Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 375–76. 
248 Id. at 378. 
249 Id. 
250 See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 515 S.W.2d 79, 86–87 (Ark. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 930 (1975); White v. State, 374 So. 2d 843, 847 (Miss. 1979); State v. Forrester, 
587 P.2d 179, 189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); see also People v. Isitt, 127 Cal. Rptr. 279, 
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upheld a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole for a first-degree rape conviction imposed upon a 
defendant who was seventeen at the time of trial.251  Then, in 
1978, the Washington Court of Appeals upheld a life sentence 
given to a seventeen-year-old defendant who was convicted, 
following a jury trial, of first-degree murder.252  Finally, in 1979, 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed a sixteen-year-old 
male’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the 
armed robbery of $21 against his assertion that it was cruel and 
unusual punishment.253  Given that the defendants in each case 
were relatively close to the age of majority at the time of their 
crimes, however, the question of “how young is too young” to 
sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment persisted.254 
The 1980s offered little additional guidance and reignited the 
question of whether the Eighth Amendment permitted 
sentencing the juvenile felon to life without parole.  Although 
state courts affirmed life sentences without parole imposed upon 
a fourteen-year-old convicted of murder255 and a fifteen-year-old 
 
285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (upholding life sentence given to seventeen-year-old 
(without discussing defendant’s age) following his conviction for kidnapping and 
robbery with bodily harm); State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 989 (Del. 1976) (holding 
life sentence for juvenile of an unspecified age is constitutional). 
251 Rogers, 515 S.W.2d at 86–87. 
252 Forrester, 587 P.2d at 189.  In Forrester, defendant murdered an elderly couple 
in their home by slashing their throats, shooting one, and stabbing the other.  Id. at 
182. 
253 White, 374 So. 2d at 847.  In White, defendant and two others flagged down a 
college student and asked her to drive them to the hospital.  Id. at 844.  Rather than 
leave the car when they arrived, defendant pointed a gun at the victim and told her 
to keep driving.  Id. at 844–45.  After defendant took the victim’s $21 and made a 
series of stops, the group finally stopped at a rest station where the victim escaped.  
Id. at 845.  In response to defendant’s Eighth Amendment sentencing challenge, the 
court offered a one-paragraph analysis, unaccompanied by legal citation or 
consideration of defendant’s age, wherein it reasoned that “[t]his was a heinous 
crime and we do not feel that life imprisonment is a cruel and unusual punishment 
under the proven facts of this case.”  Id. at 847. 
254 See Forrester, 587 P.2d at 189 n.10 (reasoning, in part, that “defendant’s 18th 
birthday was only about 2 months away when he committed the murders”). 
255 Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, 422 A.2d 116, 123–24 (Pa. 1980).  The Sourbeer 
court, however, did not discuss the role of defendant’s age when affirming his 
sentence.  Id.; see People v. Rodriguez, 480 N.E.2d 1147, 1156–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1985) (affirming life without parole sentence imposed on a minor of an unspecified 
age); Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, 443 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Mass. 1982) (affirming 
minor’s life without parole sentence and upholding constitutionality of sentencing 
statute that did not allow for consideration of minor’s age as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing). 
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convicted of rape,256 the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded 
that the Nevada and Federal Constitutions prohibited life 
sentences for juveniles who commit crimes under the age of 
sixteen.257  In Naovarath v. State, the court considered the 
constitutionality of sentencing a delusional thirteen-year-old 
seventh grader convicted of an unspecified degree of murder to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole.258  At the outset of 
its analysis, the court observed, “it is necessary to look at both 
the age of the convict and at his probable mental state at the 
time of the offense.”259  After again noting defendant’s age and 
that he was psychotic, delusional, and unable to distinguish 
reality from fantasy, the court provided the following analysis: 
Children are and should be judged by different standards from 
those imposed upon mature adults.  To say that a thirteen-
year-old deserves a fifty or sixty year long sentence, 
imprisonment until he dies, is a grave judgment indeed if not 
Draconian.  To make the judgment that a thirteen-year-old 
must be punished with this severity and that he can never be 
reformed, is the kind of judgment that, if it can be made at all, 
must be made rarely and only on the surest and soundest of 
grounds.  Looking at the case before us from this perspective, 
we conclude that the sentence of life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole imposed upon [defendant] was cruel and 
unusual under the Nevada Constitution and the United States 
Constitution.
260
 
 
256 State v. Foley, 456 So. 2d 979, 984 (La. 1984).  In Foley, fifteen-year-old 
defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of aggravated rape and sentenced to 
life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole.  Id. at 980.  In rejecting 
defendant’s contention on appeal that his sentence was “cruel and unusual,” a 
divided Louisiana Supreme Court held that “[t]he mandatory life sentence for 
aggravated rape is a valid exercise of the state legislature’s prerogative to determine 
the length of sentence for crimes classified as felonies.”  Id. at 981 (citations 
omitted).  But cf. id. at 989 (Calogero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
A little more than a decade later, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a life 
sentence without possibility of parole for a fifteen-year-old murderer was not 
unconstitutional pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.  State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 
636, 644 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 466 (La. 1995); see State v. Wilson, 
938 So. 2d 1111, 1147 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding life sentence for seventeen-
year-old murderer). 
257 Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (1989). 
258 Id. at 945. 
259 Id. at 946. 
260 Id. at 946–47. 
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Accordingly, the court ordered the sentencing court to impose a 
sentence of life with the possibility of parole.261 
The 1990s, however, ushered in the judiciary’s new “get 
tough” approach to juvenile sentencing.  Indeed, an 
overwhelming number of states affirmed life without parole 
sentences imposed upon juvenile felony defendants at a variety 
of ages notwithstanding constitutional objections, including: (1) 
a seventeen-year-old convicted of extreme indifference 
murder,262 (2) a sixteen-year-old defendant who committed 
aggravated murder and assault,263 (3) a fifteen-year-old who 
committed second-degree murder,264 (4) a fourteen-year-old who 
was an active participant in two aggravated kidnappings and an 
aggravated arson,265 and (5) a thirteen-year-old convicted of a 
 
261 Id. at 949. 
262 People v. Fernandez, 883 P.2d 491, 495 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). 
263 State v. Garcia, 561 N.W.2d 599, 609–11 (N.D. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 874 
(1997); see generally Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding 
life without parole sentence for an illiterate and mildly retarded sixteen-year-old 
convicted of first-degree murder); Foster v. Withrow, 159 F. Supp. 2d 629, 646 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001) (affirming life without parole sentence for defendant who was sixteen 
at the time he committed first-degree premeditated murder, armed robbery, and 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony), aff’d, 42 F. App’x 701 
(6th Cir. 2002); Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 1999) (vacating death 
penalty imposed on sixteen-year-old defendant convicted of murder and reducing 
sentence to life imprisonment without a possibility of parole); Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 538, 554–55 (Va. 1998) (affirming death penalty 
sentence imposed upon sixteen-year-old following his commission of capital murder 
during a carjacking). 
264 State v. Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401, 411 (Idaho 1991), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482 (Idaho 1992); see State v. Shanahan, 994 P.2d 
1059, 1061 n.1, 1062–63 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (holding that fifteen-year-old 
defendant’s life sentence for murder was not cruel and unusual); State v. Mitchell, 
577 N.W.2d 481, 488–91 (Minn. 1998) (holding that mandatory life imprisonment 
for fifteen-year-old convicted of first-degree murder is not cruel and unusual 
punishment); State v. Stinnett, 497 S.E.2d 696, 701–02 (N.C. 1998) (holding life 
without parole sentence given to fifteen-year-old for first-degree murder and assault 
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill does not violate the federal or statute 
constitutions); see also Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 566–68 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that it was not cruel and unusual to sentence defendant, who was fifteen 
years old when he committed two murders, to life in prison without parole). 
265 State v. Walker, 843 P.2d 203, 213 (Kan. 1992); see State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 
613, 623–25 (S.D. 1998) (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
for fourteen-year-old convicted of murder is not cruel and unusual); State v. Avery, 
509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (S.C. 1998) (upholding sentencing of fourteen-year-old 
convicted of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon while committing 
a violent crime to concurrent prison sentences of life, twenty-five years, and five 
years). 
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first-degree sexual offense.266  Thus, the time when the judiciary 
questioned the propriety of sentencing a juvenile to life without 
parole has long passed, and now a juvenile as young as thirteen 
may–depending on the state–be sentenced to life without 
parole.267 
 
266 State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 827–34 (N.C. 1998); see State v. Massey, 803 
P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (declining to create a distinction between a 
thirteen-year-old juvenile and an adult who are sentenced to life imprisonment 
without parole for first degree aggravated murder), cert. denied, Massey v. 
Washington, 499 U.S. 960 (1991).  Compare Matthew Thomas Wagman, Note, 
Innocence Lost: In the Wake of Green, the Trend is Clear–If You Are Old Enough 
to Do the Crime, Then You Are Old Enough to Do the Time, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 
643, 675 (2000) (criticizing the Green decision and emphasizing that the North 
Carolina Constitution provides more protections to its citizens than does the 
Federal Constitution), with Paul G. Morrissey, Note, Do the Adult Crime, Do the 
Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex 
Offender Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in State v. Green, 44 VILL. L. REV. 707, 
739 (1999) (“Based on the staggering statistics and both the local and national 
reaction to increased juvenile violence, the North Carolina Supreme Court was 
justified in holding that transferring a thirteen-year-old sex offender and sentencing 
him to life imprisonment comported with society’s standards of decency.”). 
267 The legislature’s attitude corresponds with the judiciary’s attitude; the great 
majority of jurisdictions permit life without parole sentences for offenders over the 
age of sixteen.  See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 22(1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 
13-703(A) (LexisNexis 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (2007); GA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 17-10-31.1, 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i) (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
532.030(1), 640.030(1) (LexisNexis 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 
(2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 72B (LexisNexis 2008); ch. 265, § 2 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS §§ 769.1(1)(g), 769.9 (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-151(1)(a), 97-
3-21 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 62B.390, 200.030(4)(b)(1) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 2A:4A-26, 2C:11-3g (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.12 (2007),  
2929.03(E)(1) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7301-1.3(4), tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (2008); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-23-2, 14-1-7 (2007); 
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-7605(5), 16-3-20(A) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-
134(a)(1), 39-13-202(c)(2) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206(1), 78-3a-603 
(2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303, tit. 33, § 5506 (2007). 
 Some jurisdictions make life without parole sentences mandatory upon 
conviction for murder in adult court.  See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-104(b), 9-27-
318(b)(2) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-127, 53a-35a (2008); FLA. STAT. §§ 
775.082, 985.225 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 571-22(b), 706-656 (2007); IOWA 
CODE § 902.1 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(B) (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 260B.125, 609.106 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020(2) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 169-B:24, 630:1-a(III) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2007); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 54.02(a) (Vernon 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 
2007); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.030, 13.40.110 (2008). 
 Only a finite number of jurisdictions impose statutory limits on juvenile 
punishment.  D.C. CODE § 22-2104(a) (2008) (no life without parole for crimes 
committed under age eighteen); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3(b)(2) (2008) (no life 
without parole for crimes committed under age sixteen); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.620 
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III 
THE CONTINUED NEED FOR INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCES 
Collectively, Parts I and II illustrate the potential for disparate 
results induced by determinate life without parole sentences.  
Putting aside the question of whether such a sentence is morally 
correct, automatically sentencing juvenile nonkillers to life in 
prison without parole serves only to eviscerate the now-
seemingly outdated and idealistic notion of individualized 
sentencing.  The lack of judicial unanimity on the question of 
whether a sentencing court should consider, inter alia, a juvenile 
murder accomplice’s age, mental/emotional stability, and the 
nature and circumstances of the crime further exacerbates the 
problem.  Finally, life without parole for less culpable juvenile 
murder accomplices erodes whatever is left of the rehabilitation 
ideal underlying juvenile punishment. 
Equally problematic, the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence does not resolve a juvenile 
nonkiller’s constitutional challenge to a life without parole 
sentence imposed following a felony murder or accomplice-to-
murder conviction.  Current Eighth Amendment standards do 
not provide sentencing courts with the analytical tools necessary 
to account for the stark differences in the fact scenarios 
presented by, for example, the crimes giving rise to the decisions 
discussed in Part I, namely Petty, Kaiser, Swinford, Miller, 
Jensen, and Salinas.  Therefore, the Eighth Amendment 
evidently allows a court to treat each of those defendants 
identically. 
A.  What’s the Problem? 
“The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind 
of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility 
of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”268  
Although stated in the context of capital punishment, this 
 
(2007) (no life imprisonment for juveniles waived from juvenile court); cf. 705 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805 (LexisNexis 2007); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1 
(a)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2007) (sentence of twenty to sixty years following conviction 
for first-degree murder).  Notably, several jurisdictions do not have life without 
parole sentences.  See IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4633, 
21-4638 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10 (West 2008). 
268 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988). 
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observation by the Thompson Court applies with equal force to 
the punishment of life without parole.  Yet, mandatory life 
without parole sentences for juvenile nonkillers divests from the 
sentencing court any modicum of sentencing discretion, which 
correspondingly prevents the court from considering the totality 
of offender and crime circumstances.  Although the federal 
sentencing guidelines require judges to consider, inter alia, “the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant,”269 no uniformly similar 
mandate exists at the state level.  Indeed, disparate state 
decisions fail even to clarify the extent to which age is a relevant 
consideration at sentencing.270 
Moreover, the determinate sentencing of juvenile accomplice 
nonkillers is inconsistent with what is left of the “rehabilitation-
based” approach to juvenile criminal justice.  Although the 
fundamental goal of the juvenile justice system was–and 
ostensibly still is–to rehabilitate the juvenile,271 the dynamic 
shift in response to juvenile crime has replaced the idealistic 
rehabilitative approach with lengthy determinate sentences.  
This movement has prompted courts to approve of the harsh 
juvenile penalties discussed in Part II.C and spurred various 
legislatures to lower the age at which minors can be waived into 
 
269 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). 
270 Compare, e.g., Davis v. State, 718 So.2d 1148, 1166 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) 
(upholding death sentence for twenty-three-year-old defendant, but considering 
defendant’s age as a mitigating factor); People v. Eshelman, 275 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (considering defendant’s age in determining whether a 
sentence of seventeen years’ imprisonment for the crime of second-degree murder 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Bryant v. State, 824 A.2d 60, 87 (Md. 
2003) (vacating death sentence and holding that “a defendant who has not attained 
the age of nineteen as of the date of the crime(s) is entitled to have the youthful age 
mitigator considered, albeit the weight given it may be attenuated, depending on 
the presence of non-chronological factors”), with State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 
492 (Minn. 1998) (“[I]t does not violate substantive due process that a court may 
not consider age as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child who has been 
certified as an adult and subsequently convicted of first-degree murder.”); State v. 
Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the proportionality 
test “does not embody an element or consideration of the defendant’s age, only a 
balance between the crime and the sentence imposed”).  See Benjamin L. Felcher, 
Kids Get the Darndest Sentences: State v. Mitchell and Why Age Should Be a Factor 
in Sentencing for First Degree Murder, 18 LAW & INEQ. 323, 348 (2000) (noting that 
“the moment of certification to adult court determined Mitchell’s sentence”). 
271 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). 
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adult court.272  The less restrictive waiver provisions and the 
trend of punishing more minors like adults for a growing number 
of crimes, reflect a philosophical shift in juvenile punishment 
ideology from rehabilitative to punitive.273 
This shift in response to juvenile crime has, as outlined 
throughout this Article, in some cases inappropriately exposed 
less culpable juvenile nonkillers to mandatory life without parole 
sentences.  Although some jurisdictions have responded by 
reforming their approach to juvenile punishment,274 the awkward 
juxtaposition between determinate sentencing schemes and the 
eviscerated idealistic goals of the juvenile court hardly provides 
a clear recipe for uniformity.275 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Provides No Answers 
A juvenile petitioner convicted of murder pursuant to 
accomplice liability, coconspirator liability, or the felony-murder 
rule, could likely challenge the constitutionality of a life without 
parole sentence in one of two ways.  First, petitioner could 
undertake the “heavy burden” of asserting that the punishment 
 
272 See Hofacket, supra, note 243, at 163–64.  Most notably, between 1990 and 
1996, forty legislatures passed laws designed to make it easier to prosecute juveniles 
as adults.  David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of 
the Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642 (2002) (arguing that change in legislative landscape 
produced “less individualized justice and more decisions based solely on the nature 
of the charged offense”). 
273 See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal 
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 72–90 
(1997).  Given the decreasing effectiveness of the juvenile court, some 
commentators have argued to abolish the court altogether.  Id. at 69 (“[S]tates 
should abolish juvenile courts’ delinquency jurisdiction and formally recognize 
youthfulness as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of younger criminal 
offenders.”). 
274 See infra note 332 and accompanying text; see also Patricia Torbet & Linda 
Szymanskiat, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT 
JUVENILE CRIME: 1996–97 UPDATE 7 (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles/172835.pdf (outlining Texas’s revision to juvenile punishment by 
implementing blended sentencing). 
275 Cf. Jennifer A. Chin, Note & Comment, Baby-Face Killers: A Cry for Uniform 
Treatment for Youths Who Murder, From Trial to Sentencing, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 287, 
318 (1999) (“To eliminate the disparate treatment from state to state of juvenile 
delinquents for similar criminal offenses, society requires uniformity in the law by 
employing the same juvenile procedures nationwide.”). 
GALLINI.FMT 12/8/2008  11:01:36 AM 
2008] Equal Sentences for Unequal Participation 79 
is contrary to society’s evolving standards of decency.  
Alternatively, petitioner could argue that the sentence is 
disproportionate to the crime.  Neither the Trop analysis nor the 
proportionality test, however, provides the analytical tools 
necessary to resolve either challenge.  Simply stated, the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is 
unworkable in this context. 
1.  “Evolving standards of decency” 
To evaluate a juvenile accomplice’s evolving standards of 
decency challenge pursuant to Trop, a reviewing court must 
assimilate some combination of the following factors: (1) 
whether a nationwide consensus favors the challenged 
punishment,276 (2) the extent to which the behavior of juries and 
prosecutors invoke the challenged punishment,277 (3) its own 
judgment by focusing on whether the challenged punishment 
furthers legitimate penological goals,278 and (4) the climate of 
international law.279 
Although “[t]he beginning point is a review of objective 
indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the 
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question,”280 
two questions immediately spring to mind: first, how should 
courts define the ambiguous term “consensus;” and second, what 
evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the requisite consensus? 
As to the first question, the following examples clarify that an 
inordinate number of ways exist to define a “national 
consensus.”  For instance, assigning a narrow definition to the 
term “national consensus” may reveal a lack of applicable 
sources and, thus, an inability to find the requisite consensus in 
favor of the challenged punishment.  Indeed, if a court construed 
the inquiry strictly by focusing specifically on whether juvenile 
murder accomplices should always receive sentences of life 
 
276 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005); Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 n.7 (1988). 
277 See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 n.7; Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976). 
278 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 n.8 (citing Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). 
279 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–78; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830; see Coker, 433 U.S. at 
596 n.10 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958)). 
280 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
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without parole, it would likely find no applicable state legislative 
enactments. 
Consider, however, the possible result obtained by expanding 
the inquiry to whether the more recent enactments of state 
legislatures reveal a growing disapproval of the felony-murder 
rule.  A brief overview of the felony-murder rule’s origins 
reflects its early popularity.281  Indeed, the first real felony-
murder statute was enacted in 1827 when Illinois defined murder 
to include a “felony exception”282 by which a death occurring 
 
281 The true origins of the felony-murder rule are difficult to trace.  In 1235, 
Henry de Bracton assessed the culpability of a person who unintentionally killed 
another by distinguishing between whether the death occurred during a lawful or 
unlawful act.  Binder, supra note 16, at 74.  In contrast, Edward Coke in 1628 
articulated a much harsher rule by defining murder broadly to include unintentional 
deaths resulting from intentional unlawful acts.  Id. at 81.  Cases applying these 
felony-murder principles, however, were few and indeed did not appear until the 
end of the nineteenth century, e.g., R. v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129, 130–31 (Kent 
Assizes 1862); R. v. Serné, 16 Cox’s Crim. L. Cas. 311 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1887), well 
after the time English law would have influenced American law, see Birdsong, supra 
note 16, at 18.  But see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 816–17 (1982) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (asserting that “the common-law [felony-murder] rule was 
transplanted to the American Colonies”).  Perhaps not surprisingly, then, at least 
two commentators assert that the American felony-murder rule developed 
independently from England’s.  Birdsong, supra note 16, at 17; Binder, supra note 
16, at 108. 
282 Binder, supra note 16, at 162 n.530.  Perhaps the truest precursor to the 
Illinois statute is the Pennsylvania Reform Act of 1794, which divided murder into 
degrees and provided that murder “committed in the perpetration of or attempt to 
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary” constituted murder in the first 
degree.  Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of 
Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 771–72 (1949); see JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 658 (Little, Brown and Co. 1858).  
Although the Reform Act was actually a “felony aggravator statute,” Pennsylvania 
courts nevertheless construed the Reform Act to have the effect of a true felony-
murder rule.  See Binder, supra note 16, at 145; see also Commonwealth v. 
Flanagan, 7 Watts & Serg. 415, 418 (Pa. 1844) (affirming a first-degree murder 
conviction after approving the jury instruction: “[I]f the homicide took place in the 
commission or attempt to perpetrate [arson, rape, robbery, or burglary], it is . . . 
murder in the first degree.”); Commonwealth v. Epps, 44 A. 570, 571 (Pa. 1899) 
(calling the question of whether the defendant intended to kill a robbery victim 
“wholly immaterial” because the death occurred during the defendant’s attempted 
commission of the robbery); Brown v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 319, 330–31 (Pa. 
1874) (recognizing that murder requires “malice aforethought, either express or 
implied” but reasoning that in the absence of deliberateness or premeditation, “the 
perpetration of or the attempt to perpetrate . . . arson, rape, robbery, or burglary” 
would render the party “guilty of murder in the first degree, for he would come 
within the very words of the statute”).  As a “felony aggravator statute,” the 
Reform Act could raise the degree of murder if it occurred during an enumerated 
offense.  Binder, supra note 16, at 144–46; see People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 323 
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during an “unlawful act” would be “deemed and adjudged to be 
murder.”283  Other jurisdictions soon followed by enacting their 
own felony-murder statutes.  In 1829, New Jersey enacted a 
statute imposing murder liability for both enumerated felonies 
and “any unlawful act against the peace of this state, of which 
the probable consequence may be bloodshed.”284  That same 
year, New York defined murder to include killings “without any 
design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of 
any felony”285 and later expanded the definition to include 
deaths occurring during any felony.286  Texas then amended its 
penal code to allow for murder convictions based either on 
deaths occurring during an enumerated felony, or a theory of 
“transferred intent.”287 
Since these early enactments, however, a number of U.S. 
jurisdictions have limited the effect of the felony-murder 
 
(Mich. 1980) (noting that a statute of similar language only aggravates the degree of 
murder and does not provide the malice for elevating manslaughter to murder). 
283 Binder, supra note 16, at 121 (quoting ILL. REV. CODE. CRIM. CODE § 22 
(1827)).  The Illinois Supreme Court, however, did not have a chance to interpret 
this “felony exception” until 1883 when, in Mayes v. People, it interpreted the 
statute’s language to mean that the defendant’s intent was “utterly immaterial.”  
106 Ill. 306, 313 (1883).  But cf. Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511, 517 (1854) (imposing 
liability on a defendant who encouraged or aided and abetted an unlawful act 
resulting in death, regardless of whether he intended for the death to occur).  
According to the court, “manifest[ing] a reckless, murderous disposition” and 
“act[ing] solely from general malicious recklessness, disregarding any and all 
consequences” was sufficient to support a murder conviction.  Mayes, 106 Ill. at 313. 
284 Binder, supra note 16, at 121 (citing Act of Feb. 17, 1829, § 66, 1828-1829 N.J. 
Acts 109, 128).  In State v. Cooper, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that a 
killing would amount to murder if committed during the course of felony 
“especially if death were a probable consequence of the [felony].”  13 N.J.L. 361, 1 
(1833). 
285 Binder, supra note 16, at 121 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 1, § 5 
(1829)). 
286 Id. at 173 (citing Act of May 29, 1873, ch. 644, 1873 N.Y. Laws 1014).  Early 
decisions seemed to limit the applicability of the felony-murder doctrine to 
accomplices.  See People v. Van Steenburgh, 1 Parker’s Crim. Rep. 39 (N.Y. Ct. 
Oyer & Terminer 1845).  During a riot where an officer was shot and killed, fifty 
men were convicted of various crimes yet only two were ultimately convicted for 
the killing.  Id. 
287 Binder, supra note 16, at 168; Rodriguez v. State, 953 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1997); see, e.g., McCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 33 (1860) (providing example of 
“transferred intent” doctrine in the context of felony murder); Richards v. State, 30 
S.W. 805, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895).  Notably, Texas was the “felony murder 
center of America during the nineteenth century, with about one-fourth of all the 
reported felony murder convictions in the country.”  Binder, supra note 16, at 167. 
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doctrine.  Pennsylvania, for instance, has reduced the degree and 
corresponding punishment for felony murder to murder in the 
second degree.288  Other jurisdictions require a mens rea beyond 
the mere intent to commit the underlying felony to sustain a 
murder conviction.289  Still other jurisdictions allow less-culpable 
accomplices to raise an affirmative defense to a felony-murder 
charge.290 
Perhaps more significantly, at least four jurisdictions have 
abolished the felony-murder rule.291  In the course of formally 
abolishing its felony-murder statute, the Hawaii legislature noted 
that even a “limited formulation [of] the felony-murder rule is 
still objectionable.”292  Similarly, Kentucky’s legislature 
abandoned felony murder in favor of an “intentional” and 
“wantonness with extreme indifference” standard.293  In contrast, 
Ohio statutory law now states that “[n]o person shall cause the 
death of another . . . as a proximate result of the offender’s 
committing or attempting to commit a felony.”294  Finally, 
Michigan abandoned its felony-murder rule by judicial decision 
in 1980.295  The collective movement by state legislatures away 
from original formulations of the felony-murder rule suggests its 
growing disfavor and may therefore justify a court’s decision to 
hold that the evolving standards of decency preclude the 
imposition of a life without parole sentence on a less-culpable 
juvenile nonkiller convicted of felony murder. 
 
288 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 2008); accord ALASKA STAT. § 
11.41.110 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
203 (West 2007). 
289 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(2) (2007) (requiring a defendant to 
recklessly cause a death while committing or attempting to commit any felony to 
sustain a first-degree murder conviction). 
290 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2008) (providing an affirmative 
defense if the defendant did not (1) commit or solicit the killing, (2) carry a deadly 
weapon, (3) reasonably believe his accomplices were armed with deadly weapons, 
and (4) reasonably believe his accomplices intended for the death or injury to 
occur). 
291 See, e.g., People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 325–26 (1980). 
292 See id. at 314 (citations omitted). 
293 Meredith v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Ky. 2005) (explaining that 
a defendant’s culpability “must now be measured by the degree of wantonness or 
recklessness reflected by the extent of his participation in the underlying robbery” 
(citation omitted)), discussing KY. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (West 2007). 
294 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (West 2007). 
295 Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 325–26. 
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Alternatively, a court need only tweak the inquiry to approve 
the punishment by focusing on (1) the offender’s age and the 
proposed punishment, without also considering the offender’s 
role;296 or (2) whether the crime committed by the juvenile 
would be murder if committed by an adult.297 
The second question–what evidence is sufficient to 
demonstrate a national consensus–also presents something of a 
moving target.  Although the Supreme Court has expressed a 
preference for relying on the enactments of state legislatures, it 
has not indicated that state statutes comprise the only acceptable 
evidence of a “national consensus.”298  The Supreme Court’s 
imprecise instructions for how to demonstrate a national 
consensus arguably extends to reviewing courts an invitation to 
 
296 Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1996).  In Harris, fifteen-year-old 
Michael Harris and thirteen-year-old Barry Massey entered Paul Wang’s store 
where Massey shot and stabbed Wang to death, after which the two emptied the 
cash register, took assorted merchandise, and left.  Id. at 582.  Following his 
conviction and sentence of life in prison without parole, Harris appealed and 
asserted that his sentence was cruel and unusual because he was a fifteen-year-old 
first-time offender and his codefendant killed the victim.  Id. at 582–83.  Viewing 
the “national consensus” prong broadly, the Ninth Circuit asked whether there 
existed “a strong legislative consensus against imposing mandatory life without 
parole on offenders who commit their crimes before the age of sixteen.”  Id. at 583.  
This broad view allowed the court to conclude that Harris could not meet his 
“heavy burden” to demonstrate that the evolving standards of decency precluded 
his sentence because at least twenty-one states allowed for the imposition of 
mandatory life without parole on fifteen-year-olds.  Id. at 583–84. 
 Moreover, according to the court, Harris’s sentence was not disproportionate to 
his crime.  Id. at 585 (“[W]hile capital punishment is unique and must be treated 
specially, mandatory life imprisonment without parole is, for young and old alike, 
only an outlying point on the continuum of prison sentences.”).  Yet, one 
commentator criticized the Harris decision for failing “to address adequately the 
unique station of juvenile defendants within the proportionality formula.”  Recent 
Case, Eighth Amendment–Juvenile Sentencing–Ninth Circuit Upholds Life 
Sentence Without Possibility of Parole of Fifteen-Year-Old Murderer, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 1185, 1185 (1997); see Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: 
Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 691–93 
(1998) (criticizing the Harris decision and arguing that “age must play a distinct and 
central role in the proportionality analysis of juvenile [life without parole] 
sentences”); Hofacket, supra note 243, at 180–81 (criticizing the Harris court’s 
failure “to address the Supreme Court’s assurance that ‘individualized 
consideration’ of a juvenile’s maturity is performed when trying and sentencing 
minors”). 
297 E.g., Thomas v. State, 562 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
298 As noted, the Court has also relied on the judgment of juries.  Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 
(1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794–96 (1982). 
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expand their analysis by relying on more attenuated sources like 
the decisions of state courts.  Yet, relying on the decisions of 
state courts to establish a national consensus leaves unresolved 
the question of what impact another state court’s decision should 
have if rendered on the basis of that state’s constitution. 
Alternatively, nothing definitively prevents a court from 
turning to congressional findings for objective indicia of 
consensus.  Consider, then, the congressional findings published 
in connection with the codification of the Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act (“Juvenile Act”) where Congress 
observed that “[a]lthough the juvenile violent crime arrest rate 
in 1999 was the lowest in the decade, there remains a consensus 
that the number of crimes and the rate of offending by juveniles 
nationwide is still too high.”299  Moreover, the Juvenile Act lists 
an array of figures demonstrating how current methods of 
juvenile crime prevention and punishment are failing.300  The 
Juvenile Act then cryptically suggests that, to address the 
problem of juvenile crime, juvenile punishments should include 
“methods for increasing victim satisfaction with respect to the 
penalties imposed on juveniles for their acts.”301  These 
illustrative examples serve only to amplify the point that a court 
can manipulate the consensus inquiry by simply changing the 
search parameters.  Indeed, any of these examples provide an 
adequate definition for, and evidence of, a national consensus. 
Defining national consensus in this manner, however, hardly 
reveals the nationwide sentiment toward sentencing less-
culpable juvenile nonkillers to life in prison without parole. 
Instead, this analytical framework allows the cooperative 
relationship between automatic transfer statutes and 
determinate sentencing statutes to persist.  As the Miller court 
observed, those statutes may require a sentencing court to treat 
juvenile nonkillers in the same manner it would treat an 
accomplished adult serial killer.302  This same statutory 
relationship does not reflect that a majority of state legislatures 
would affirm the practice of sentencing all juvenile accomplice 
 
299 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
300 See 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(6) (reporting that the number of cities reporting gang 
problems has increased 843%). 
301 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(10)(B). 
302 See People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 308 (Ill. 2002). 
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nonkillers to life in prison, particularly those convicted of felony 
murder.303  Given the ease with which courts can manipulate–
even perhaps unintentionally–the meaning of “national 
consensus,” this aspect of the Trop analysis cannot resolve more 
focused punishment questions. 
Second, without additional Supreme Court guidance, the 
manner in which one inquires into the “behavior” of juries and 
prosecutors seems open to interpretation.  To aid in the 
resolution of this inquiry, the Thompson Court relied on 
Department of Justice statistics, noting that such statistics help 
identify trends in societal views.304  The Department of Justice 
does not maintain statistics on the number of juvenile nonkillers 
convicted of felony murder, or murder as 
accomplices/coconspirators, and serving life sentences.305  
Although the Office of Justice Programs (within the Department 
of Justice) keeps extremely detailed statistics on an inordinate 
number of trends in juvenile crime,306 none approaches the 
specificity needed to examine juries’ and prosecutors’ 
approaches to sentencing juvenile nonkillers convicted of 
murder.  Thus, in this context, any inquiry into the behavior of 
juries and prosecutors appears futile. 
Third, this Article can only speculate as to how a reviewing 
court might exercise its own judgment.  By piecing together 
anecdotal rationale from Roper and its progeny, it is clear that a 
reviewing court should reject the notion that sentencing a 
juvenile nonkiller convicted of murder to life without parole 
furthers the traditional penological goals of retribution, 
 
303 See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 727 (Cal. 1983). 
304 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832–33 (1988). 
305 According to the Human Rights Watch, “[e]ach state department of 
corrections has its own method for coding the type of crime committed by its 
prisoners.”  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE REST OF 
THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 26 n.46 (2005), http://hrw.org/en/reports/2005/10/11/rest-their-lives-0.  
Additionally, “in many states the category of ‘first degree murder’ or ‘murder’ 
includes both intentional homicide and the felony crime described in the text as 
‘felony murder.’”  Id.  As a result, it becomes “difficult to determine which types or 
sub-categories of youth crimes tended to result in a life without parole sentence.”  
Id. 
306 HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT, http://ojjdp.ncjrs 
.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf. 
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deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.307  Instead, in the 
exercise of its own judgment, a reviewing court should likely 
reason, as did the Thompson and Roper Courts, that the case for 
justifying juvenile sentences by reference to penological goals is 
not as strong with a minor as with an adult.308 
Lastly, the climate of international law unambiguously reflects 
a worldwide disdain for life without parole sentences imposed 
upon children under the age of eighteen,309 a far broader 
proposition than is undertaken by this Article.  The Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) states, in pertinent part, that 
“‘[n]either capital punishment nor life imprisonment without 
possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age.’”310  Importantly, as of 
2005, 192 out of a total of 194 countries were parties to the CRC; 
only the United States and Somalia have declined to ratify the 
CRC (although both have signed it).311 
The “evolving standards of decency” inquiry is both overly 
flexible and “tantalizingly vague.”312  It allows courts to craft and 
define their own version of a national consensus, selectively rely 
on tangentially related statistics, and exercise their own 
judgment to either accept or reject a juvenile nonkiller’s 
sentencing challenge.  Accordingly, one reviewing court might 
sustain a sentencing challenge proffered by Kaiser, Swinford, or 
Miller, while another rejects identical challenges from Petty, 
 
307 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 305, at 111–13 (discussing how life 
without parole sentences for juveniles fail to meet any of the four goals of 
punishment). 
308 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 
837–38. 
309 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 305, at 98 (“Recognizing the 
unacceptability of sentences that negate the potential of children to make changes 
for the better over time, the [Convention on the Rights of the Child] flatly prohibits 
sentencing children to life sentences without parole or to the death penalty.”).  But 
cf. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (discussing Article 37 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child). 
310 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 305, at 98 (quoting CRC, art. 37(a)) 
(emphasis removed). 
311 Id. at 99.  “The United States signed the CRC on February 16, 1995, and 
Somalia signed on May 2, 2002.”  Id. at 99 n.293. 
312 Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court 
and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1480 (2002). 
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Jensen, or Salinas.313  The potential for such disparate results 
suggests that courts should reject the Trop analysis in the unique 
context of a sentencing challenge proffered by a juvenile 
nonkiller convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison 
without parole. 
2.  Proportionality 
Second, a juvenile nonkiller sentenced to life in prison without 
the possibility of parole could proffer a disproportionality 
argument.314  Any modern court’s response to a proportionality 
challenge must focus on objective criteria and specifically begin 
with considering the gravity of the offense and the harshness of 
the punishment.315  A reviewing court must likewise consider the 
severity of the crime alongside the juvenile’s criminal history.316  
As noted, unless the juvenile’s sentence leads to an inference of 
disproportionality, the inquiry ends after a court considers this 
factor.317 
Applying this test to hypothetical sentencing challenges from 
the six defendants discussed in Part I, supra, reveals that the 
Supreme Court’s standards do not provide a sentencing court 
with the tools necessary to resolve an Eighth Amendment 
challenge at the time of sentencing.  Although the Court’s 
opinions collectively counsel reviewing courts to examine 
specifically a juvenile’s offense and punishment, the 
proportionality analysis makes no provision for dealing with the 
“statutory bootstrapping” problem confronted by the Miller 
 
313 As discussed earlier, a hypothetical challenge by a defendant like Kaiser 
carries the unique context of applying felony murder to less-culpable juvenile 
nonkillers.  See generally supra Part I and accompanying discussion.  Moreover, as a 
broad proposition, it seems the felony-murder rule was never intended to apply to 
juvenile accomplices.  See Drizin & Keegan, supra note 13, at 531; see also Scott 
Robinson, Felony Murder Statute Dates to 1535 English Law, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS, March 29, 2005, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/news 
_columnists/article/0,1299,DRMN_86_3658375,00.html (criticizing Colorado’s 
felony-murder rule and noting that “[p]arliament abolished the doctrine of felony 
murder in 1957, based on the recognition that the rule often had overly harsh 
consequences”). 
314 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
315 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 597–98 (1977)). 
316 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003). 
317 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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court (i.e., the convergence of automatic transfer, 
accountability/felony-murder, and mandatory-punishment 
statutes).  Thus, short of finding these statutes unconstitutional, 
as did the trial court in Miller,318 nothing allows a sentencing 
court to independently consider a juvenile’s circumstances at 
sentencing.  Problems of judicial inefficiency aside, failing to 
provide a lower court with the opportunity to render a 
subsequent appeal unnecessary by considering offender and 
punishment circumstances during sentencing is perhaps the 
largest flaw in the disproportionality analysis. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a reviewing court has the 
opportunity to consider the gravity of the offense and nature of 
the punishment, juveniles like Darla Jo Swinford and Leon 
Miller may, given their minimal roles in the underlying murders, 
be entitled to an “inference of disproportionality.”319  Although 
murder is “the most extreme of crimes”320 neither Swinford nor 
Miller had a prior juvenile record and each received the harshest 
possible sentence, short of death,321 for their minimal roles in the 
underlying crime.  Moreover, compared to the principal 
perpetrators, both Swinford and Miller had only a “passive” role 
in the victims’ deaths.322 
Ordinarily, Supreme Court jurisprudence next requires a 
hypothetical reviewing court considering a sentencing challenge 
from a defendant like Miller or Swinford to evaluate: (1) the 
 
318 People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 303–04 (Ill. 2002). 
319 See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 721 (Cal. 1983); see also Tison v. Arizona, 
481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (focusing on participation level of defendants and noting 
that “substantial participation in a violent felony under circumstances likely to 
result in the loss of innocent human life may justify the death penalty even absent 
an ‘intent to kill’” (emphasis added)).  To avoid belaboring the point, this 
paragraph and corresponding subsection focus exclusively on Swinford and Miller 
solely for illustrative purposes.  Of course, similar arguments could be made on 
behalf of defendant Kaiser, discussed above in Part I. 
320 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality). 
321 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1025–26 (1991) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
322 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 (1983).  The Solem Court appeared to 
define a “passive felony” as one that involves “neither violence nor threat of 
violence to any person.”  Id.  If a reviewing court strictly applied this definition, 
then surely Swinford’s and Miller’s mere involvement in the murder would preclude 
a court from categorizing their felony as “passive.”  Thus, only if a reviewing court 
focused on their roles in the felony could they earn the passive designation. 
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sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdictions,323 
and (2) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime 
in other jurisdictions.324  Yet, on the basis of vicarious-liability 
statutes,325 states can punish convicted conspirators, accomplices, 
or abettors to a capital murder with, at a minimum, life in 
prison.326  Those laws were, however, enacted to address adult–
not juvenile–offenders.327  Thus, reviewing courts cannot infer 
that each state’s legislature has made a specific decision to 
sentence the less-culpable juvenile nonkiller accomplice to life in 
prison without parole.328  Doing so arguably enables the 
reviewing court to at least partially individualize each juvenile’s 
sentence. 
A court undertaking this analysis must also consider the 
additional factors listed by the Solem Court.329  Particularly 
mindful of Solem’s offering that “[a] court . . . is entitled to look 
at a defendant’s motive in committing a crime,”330 reviewing 
 
323 Id. at 291. 
324 Id. 
325 Although separate statutes exist governing an accomplice’s criminal liability, 
see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-301, 13-303 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
271 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (2008); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 306 (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02 (Vernon 2007), 
being an accomplice is ordinarily not a separately chargeable offense; it is instead a 
theory that the state may utilize to establish the commission of a substantive 
criminal offense, see, e.g., State v. Woods, 815 P.2d 912, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); 
People v. Verlinde, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
326 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 (2008); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
265, § 2 (LexisNexis 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2008). 
327 See generally Christine Chamberlin, Note, Not Kids Anymore: A Need for 
Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 391, 403 
(2001) (“[I]f jurisdiction over a juvenile is transferred to adult court and the juvenile 
is found guilty of the offense, the court may impose upon the juvenile the adult 
sanction appropriate for the offense.”); Cathi J. Hunt, Note, Juvenile Sentencing: 
Effects of Recent Punitive Sentencing Legislation on Juvenile Offenders and a 
Proposal for Sentencing in the Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 621, 633 
(1999) (“Transfer represents a decision that the more punitive sentences the adult 
criminal justice system offers are necessary for the particular juvenile offender.”). 
328 See Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29, 35 n.12 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (noting Congress did not consider the issue, and thus court was unwilling 
to assume Congressional intent); United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337, 
1342 (9th Cir. 2001) (Canby, J., dissenting) (noting that it is error for a court to 
assume, without evidence, that Congress actually considered and rejected certain 
alternatives). 
329 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293–94 (1983) (listing additional factors). 
330 Id. at 293. 
GALLINI.FMT 12/8/2008  11:01:36 AM 
90 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 29 
courts should construe the term “motive” broadly and view this 
language as an invitation to investigate any aspects of the 
juvenile’s background that led to his or her participation in the 
crime.331 
Regardless of how a court ultimately assimilates the maze that 
is Solem, Harmelin, Ewing, Lockyer, and others, the problematic 
reality is that, even if a less-culpable juvenile nonkiller ultimately 
challenges his or her sentence of life without parole following a 
murder conviction obtained pursuant to a charge of felony 
murder or coconspirator/accomplice liability, the remedy, if any, 
comes at the end of a lengthy string of appeals.  Given a state 
trial court’s inability to consider offender circumstances at the 
time of a defendant’s sentencing, both courts and legislatures 
should reexamine the propriety of sentencing the less-culpable 
juvenile nonkiller to life in prison without parole.  Specifically, 
state legislatures should revisit the laws governing juvenile 
sentences in order to individualize punishments in accordance 
with the juvenile perpetrator’s participation.332 
Alternatively, at a minimum, sentencing courts should retain 
the discretion to account for the juvenile’s age, criminal and 
 
331 For example, in Swinford, the Mississippi Supreme Court should have viewed 
the sentencing court’s decision to sentence Swinford without the benefit of a 
presentencing report as unacceptable.  See Sucik v. State, 689 A.2d 78, 81 (Md. 
1997) (“When a trial court ignores the PSI requirement, it acts counter to the 
requirements of the very law that makes possible a sentence of life without 
parole.”); see also State v. Maschek, 706 So. 2d 512, 516 (La. Ct. App. 1998) 
(remanding for resentencing of defendant and noting “the court’s decision to ignore 
the recommendation of the PSI and impose a stricter sentence is disturbing because 
it is based upon unsupported evidentiary facts”). 
332 Colorado, for example, recently reversed its life without parole statute for 
juveniles and now imposes a determinate forty-year sentence on juveniles 
prosecuted directly as adults or transferred from juvenile court.  COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(I), 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(II) (2008) (stating that the revised penalty 
provided in “paragraph (b) shall apply to persons sentenced for offenses committed 
on or after July 1, 2006”).  The change was overdue; Colorado ranked eleventh in 
the nation for the rate at which life sentences are imposed on juveniles and applied 
felony-murder charges disproportionately to juveniles.  Miles Moffeit & Kevin 
Simpson, Teen Crime, Adult Time: Laws Converge to Put Teens Away Forever, 
DENVER POST, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.denverpost.com/teencrime/ci_3636564 
(“Among [Colorado] juveniles sentenced to life since 1998, 60 percent went to 
prison on felony[-]murder convictions, compared with 24 percent of adult cases.”); 
see Gwen Florio & Sue Lindsay, Locked up Forever: Debate Builds over the Fate of 
46 Teen Killers Sentenced to Life in Prison Without Parole, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS, Sept. 16, 2005, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/local/article/ 
0,1299,DRMN_15_4083343,00.html (noting that one of every eight inmates serving 
life without parole sentences in Colorado was convicted as a juvenile). 
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family history, mental health, and role in the crime.333  
Regardless of the source, be it judicial or legislative, the law 
should account for the unique circumstances of juvenile’s role in 
the killing at sentencing rather than the end of the appellate 
process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s current Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence is not prepared to resolve the persistent and 
perhaps growing problem of sentencing less-culpable juvenile 
murder accomplices to life without parole.334  Although the 
Court has expressed a willingness to treat juvenile punishment 
differently, it has not had occasion to evaluate the 
constitutionality of sentencing less-culpable juvenile nonkillers 
to life without parole following their murder convictions 
pursuant to felony murder, coconspirator, or accomplice liability.  
Until the Court has an opportunity to consider the issue, 
sentencing courts will continue to punish juvenile nonkiller 
accomplices without considering factors like offender 
characteristics, motive, level of participation, or the nature of the 
crime.335  Such one-dimensional sentencing is plainly inconsistent 
 
333 In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 931–32 (Cal. 1972) (outlining the “techniques” a 
reviewing court must employ when determining whether a punishment violates the 
“cruel or unusual” clause of the California Constitution); see People v. Gonzalez, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247, 257–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (applying Lynch in the context of 
juvenile offenders).  Although such techniques remain wrapped up in the appeals 
process, the “techniques”–like the Solem Court’s approach–at least seek to 
individualize each defendant’s sentence. 
334 Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 272, at 667 (“[B]ecause prosecutorial waivers 
and legislative waivers are more difficult to track, it is currently not known how 
many total youths under eighteen years of age are prosecuted as adults each year; at 
least one estimate places the number as high as 200,000.”).  Accurate statistics are 
indeed difficult to come by; some statistics reflecting the increase in juvenile gang 
violence suggest that courts may increasingly encounter varied participation levels 
from juvenile accomplice nonkillers like the fact patterns presented by the case 
studies in this Article.  See supra note 303 and accompanying text.  Conversely, 
other studies suggest that juvenile violence began decreasing in the 1990s.  See 
Hofacket, supra note 243, at 164–65. 
335 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697–98 (1975) (noting that American 
criminal law has long considered a defendant’s intention to be critical to “the 
degree of [his] criminal culpability”). 
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with the uniformly desirable judicial goal of individualizing each 
defendant’s punishment.336 
 
 
 
336 See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (“It is necessary to 
individualize each case, to give that careful, humane and comprehensive 
consideration to the particular situation of each offender which would be possible 
only in the exercise of a broad discretion.”). 
